The Next Generation of Public Policy Theories:
Transcript of the 2008 *Public Policy Shoot-Out* in Norman, Oklahoma

The transcript that follows was taken from a discussion among public policy theorists at the Public Policy Workshop, hosted by the University of Oklahoma in Norman, OK, on February 29th of 2008. The scholars present included a cross-section of established policy theorists paired with their choice of current or recent graduate students. The Workshop was initiated with a series of presentations in which each scholar/student pair described (and prescribed) the "next generation" developments in public policy theory. The articles on which the Workshop presentations were based were submitted to peer-review and editing, and appear as a set in Volume 37, Issue 1 (February, 2009), of the *Policy Studies Journal*. The discussion following the presentations was intended to identify where there was broad consensus as well as significant difference of opinion concerning the strengths and weaknesses of extant policy theories, and to debate the most promising directions for theoretical development.

The text of the transcript is largely presented as spoken at the Workshop. Participants were offered the opportunity to review the transcript and make corrections of meaning. While most participants made light edits, the conversational tone of the discussion is retained.

The names and affiliations of the participants in the Workshop are as follows:

Xavier Basurto, Graduate Student. University of Arizona.
Peter DeLeon, Professor. University of Colorado at Denver.
Erik Godwin, Assistant Professor. Texas A&M University.
Alisa Hicklin, Assistant Professor. University of Oklahoma.
Tom James, Associate Professor. University of Oklahoma.
Hank Jenkins-Smith, Professor. University of Oklahoma.
Ashley Jochim, Graduate Student. University of Washington.
Bryan Jones, Professor. University of Washington.
Michael Jones, Graduate Student. University of Oklahoma.
Stéphane Lavertu, Graduate Student. University of Wisconsin at Madison.
Larry Lynn, Professor. University of Texas and University of Chicago.
Ken Meier, Professor. Texas A&M University.
Robbei Robichau, Graduate Student. Arizona State University.
Paul Sabatier, Professor. University of California at Davis.
Edella Schalager, Professor. University of Arizona.
Anne Schneider, Professor. Arizona State University.
Mara Sidney, Associate Professor. Rutgers University.
Danielle Varda, Assistant Professor. University of Colorado at Denver.
Chris Weible, Assistant Professor. University of Colorado at Denver.
David Weimer, Professor. University of Wisconsin at Madison.
Sam Workman, Graduate Student. University of Washington.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

I am now going to turn the Workshop agenda over to Glen Krutz and Warren Eller. They have built a set of questions on the basis of the discussions that we had yesterday as part of the paper presentations.

Glen Krutz:

Thanks Hank. Recently, Hank approached Warren Eller and myself to lead this discussion and edit an accompanying special issue of *Policy Studies Journal* based on the papers presented yesterday. I'm Glen Krutz. I'm an associate professor in Political Science here at The University of Oklahoma and the Associate Director of the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center. My research has a foot in American institutions and a foot in policy. Warren?

Warren Eller:

I'm currently on the faculty at Louisiana State University serving as the associate director of the Stephenson Disaster Management Institute, and since I have a great deal of experience now in crises and crisis management, moderating this discussion would be a good application of those talents. [laughter]

Glen Krutz:

Hank approached us about moderating this wrap-up session, if you can use the word "moderating" for what's going to happen here today. More like refereeing. A couple things we wanted to throw out before we get started. We have a few power point slides we're going to work through to try and move the discussion along. We don't want to overly structure it because that could be very dangerous in a discussion like this and in institutions in general. We would especially like to invite junior scholars to jump in. We don't mean to say that we do not want senior scholars to jump in. We know you certainly will. We just also want hear from the junior scholars present.

First, let's address the big picture: what will the future directions of policy theory be? What would we like them to be? Are we at a point similar to what Kim Hill phrased in the 1990s? That is, are we just building something in search of theory? Have we discovered it? Or is it something that we as a group of scholars seek to develop more along the lines of normal science? Will it be a heuristic? Will it be a true theory that will generate falsifiable hypotheses? Who'd like to jump in on this one?

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

I would like to see us working up from the "bottom up". I do think that the enterprise needs to include genuine theory, from which clear and falsifiable hypotheses can be generated. But I think that when we are dealing with theory we're dealing with theory from the bottom up and theory from the top down. Part of what makes a theory compelling is that

it couples across scales. And as we were talking about yesterday, I would like to have policy process theories that bring together the micro level with the macro level, so that when we talk about individual level and group behavior we can fit them into subsystems and that subsystems fit into a much larger tapestry at the overall system level. And that would be my "taking off point" for next generation theory.

Bryan Jones:

I mean I don't know what's theory and what's not, I get confused, but if it's interesting and rigorous and empirical I think that satisfies it. What I'm concerned about is not worrying about Kim Hill's old question but how we might relate to the broader discipline of American political science. And the problems I've seen, like Glen I've been accused of also being in American institutions and one day after I, well into my career somebody accused of me being a Congress scholar. I never thought of that but I'd written a lot on Congress it turns out. And I don't think we do ourselves any favors if we don't begin to integrate our understandings of policymaking process with what our colleagues in American politics are doing, because I think they're mostly wrong-headed about how they're approaching it because it's not dynamic. You said policy process; that means change. All of us are into that in some way or another. So addressing their way of thinking is important as we try to educate them about where what we're doing and why what we're doing is important for them. And I would say two things: one is the change question, and two is somebody said, I think it was David, content really matters, what people are arguing about matters. And we understand that fundamentally and they haven't got to it.

Mara Sidney:

I would also say that I think what we bring to the broader discipline is a problem orientation. I don't know if that's part of what you mean by content, but I think keeping a focus at least to some extent on outcomes and thinking about, at the macro level, what direction policy is taking us, and what do we think of that direction, I think is critical to policy theory and policy studies.

Glen Krutz:

Peter? You had your hand up…

Peter DeLeon:

Yeah, I recognize that I'm in a room full of political scientists, but I want to argue strongly that we can't conform or tie ourselves too closely to the political science masthead. I mean there are policy issues if we focus on the issue that economic aspects or sociological aspects of. My colleague tells me about some of the good work we've done in communications theory. All of these are theories that are focused on the problem and if we

ever lose our sight on what Mara was saying, the context of the problem, then we've lost our reason. I mean, political science is useful in lots of ways and I really think that we have to transcend and become truly interdisciplinary and all of the problems that that creates.

Paul Sabatier:

And the discipline you represent is PA?

Peter DeLeon

I would hope not. Public affairs, sure, and policy sciences to use Lasswell's phrase.

Ashley Jochim:

In some ways, I disagree with that because I think a discipline provides a grounding for theory that is necessary for the field to move forward: it provides a common language for us to speak to one another. And although I recognize the importance of interdisciplinary work I also think that we need a disciplinary foundation first; whatever that discipline happens to be.

Alisa Hicklin:

But I do think that is something to talk about more broadly than just political science because I mean, some of our discussions have been about the extent to which our theories explain, sometimes we call it implementation, but all the way through to looking at outcomes and I think some of my frustration is a lot of times just getting political science to care about real outcomes becomes so frustrating and we only embed ourselves into a political science framework because of the values that political scientists hold, I think, Sometimes we might kind of give that part of the question less attention, I'm afraid.

David Weimer:

Yeah, I think there are a couple ways that our endeavor can help political science and one is I do very much believe that we are the avenue that brings the policy content back into the discipline. There's also the possibility of providing a focus for synthesis across various subfields, say American Politics or whatever. That said, I think those are worthy and potentially big contributions that all of your efforts can make. On the other hand, as someone who's interested in policy analysis, I would hope that along the way I get some advice, I get some resources for prescriptions. Otherwise, you know, you're talking just within the academy, so yes, by all means let's try to, let's help political science correct the things that they're, that the discipline is weak on. But at the same time, if we're just going to be concerned about that, then we're going to have to do this some other place.

Glen Krutz:

Ken, you had your hand up.

Ken Meier:

Let me, you know, I agree with Bryan that missionary work is valuable, and I've endorsed that before.

Paul Sabatier:

It's also dangerous.

Ken Meier:

But the problem is I'm just not as smart as Bryan is. Because what we have to do is this: we already have an additional burden studying policy, which means our theories and our results have to be realistic. Because when Dave puts something out, sometimes people read it and act on it. And as I like to say to my colleagues in voting behavior, so what if you blew your analysis of the 2004 elections, Bush still wins. You're completely irrelevant. Dave Weimer isn't completely irrelevant, so already the standard for what we do is higher than the standard for what they do. Now, I'm with you Bryan. I just don't know if I can do that and you know twist into what political scientists think is politics.

Bryan Jones:

Just real quick, I don't think that's the point. The point is that they ought to twist in, be a little more sensitive to what we're doing, which is dynamics and content and things. And you're right. The problem is realistic. How many times have any of us run into somebody who actually works in government and says what you guys are doing is interesting and I can use it? But the other stuff, I don't read it, and that's not a good sign for our discipline. Good for us, but not for them.

Anne Schneider:

I don't think political science is really the issue here. What we need is change in policy content, that is, policy design. But change for whom? What difference does change make? And it seems to me in the productions of policy theory we've got to not just care about how it works. We need to care about for whom it works and for whom it does not. I'm struck you know by your comment yesterday. Chris, you just tried to explain how "it" works. How do we choose the "it"? Why do we study policy design? What difference does policy design make? Why is there this interest in subsystems? What difference do they make? I think we need to get at this question of outcomes, quality of life, the quality of governance in this society. I'm not saying we have to posit some specific standard of governance but our variables ought to tie into the quality of governance and outcomes for society. Someone might say they don't want more egalitarian politics. Someone else might say they prefer more egalitarian

politics. This argument is not the thrust of my research, but I think our research should pay attention to those kinds of questions. We need to ask: Why is so much of government broken?

Tom James:

I agree with Peter in the sense that I don't think any of us would be, well maybe some of them back there, or Ken, are arrogant enough to think we have all the answers or that our discipline has all the answers. [Laughter] And you know what I'm saying. Those problems are multidisciplinary. You can address them in a multidisciplinary way, but the fact of the matter is that most of us work in an environment that is not multidisciplinary and sometimes the university puts barriers in the way of even trying to do that. When I first came here (University of Oklahoma) in 1980, I was associated with another research shop on campus called science and public policy which was constructed. It was political scientists, it was economists, it was geographers, it was sociologists, whose budget lines were in all our departments. It wasn't free and it was intended. It was set up to do not multidisciplinary but interdisciplinary work because none of us could solve the problems that we were dealing with, with DOE and OTE and everything by ourselves. Those kinds of units around the university have kind of gone away a little bit, and in fact when Ken was still here on the faculty at OU, you got no credit for doing the kinds of applied policy research that I do. It was about maybe 20 years ago that we finally convinced the provost who put down an edict in writing that says that in your annual evaluations you will give people credit for doing that kind of work. And it kind of brought me back to. Edella and I were talking at dinner the other night. You told me that you were asked at some department why is your policy research being done in political science? Why aren't you guys wherever? You know, so I think we do have to address that, at the same time cause those are colleagues we're talking to in the hallways every day. But at the same time we have to realize that political science views of policy per se, alone, aren't going to deal with the kinds of problem solving that I was talking about yesterday where somebody's coming out and saying we need some policy analysis help here. And I not only have to take a look at policy and political science, but I have to take a look at economics and sociology and wherever else would bring interesting things to bear on those problems. I think we have to do it all.

Glen Krutz:

Yes, I agree. We have a subsequent slide on the disciplinary aspects, incentives and disincentives. Was there anybody that wants to focus a little bit more squarely on the theory?

Chris Weible:

What is to come of political science? I'm not a political scientist although I pretend to be one sometimes. I'm…

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

You slept in a Holiday Inn last night. [laughter]

Chris Weible:

I don't really care about changing the discipline and I don't really know why it is a concern because when I look at public policy, especially policy analysis, there are sociologists doing it and economists doing it. They are often more prevalent than political scientists in what we're doing here. I was at the school of public policy at Georgia Tech and half the people in my department if not more did not know the people in this room, and they're doing public policy. They're in more need of your attention than political science. Paul kind of mentioned it, but I don't see the need to try to change political science.

Larry Lynn:

I've got a slightly different take on that in a similar vein; I'm not a political scientist either. I'm an economist in a manner of speaking, that's where I was trained. But I do all my writing nowadays in public administration and in this general domain. My sense is that trying to do policy theory without politics is insane. I'm a Madisonian. That still seems to me to be a perfectly good fit; I mean that's what we're all about. And I think Anne's is the same view that this creating institutions is what we do and what our political system does. Those institutions both shape and are shaped by choices, factors, et cetera. That's the story of policymaking and policy implementation and outcome determination. That's all to me part of politics. What I don't understand, or maybe I don't want to understand, is why we get all hung up in the discipline's problems. What I try to do within my own work is draw on the common uses within the discipline that help address the issues I'm concerned about and address the issues we're concerned about here. We're not getting hung up on whether we're contributing to the discipline or the discipline isn't being enriched by our presence or all of that. Now some people care a lot about that, but I don't. But I do care about politics. Is that possible?

Bryan Jones:

Let me just say something on that. You may be right on this, but I went through a period in my career, when I was younger, in which I tried to do urban politics. Urban politics was ga-ga over interdisciplinary stuff. They don't consider themselves political scientists. Now, it's a dying field. And when I entered public policy, for the most part it wasn't very rigorous and one of my colleagues and a fine guy said don't ever go into public policy doing stats because it's not a rigorous field. If you don't have some

grounding somewhere, you're talking about this interdisciplinary stuff with sociologists who don't know much about public policy and economists have a very benighted view of that because they took politics out of it, they don't understand institutional development and all of that stuff is in political science. They don't do it the way we do it, but that's there, politics, institutions, and public policy are all fundamental to political science, but nowhere else. And if we don't ground ourselves in a fundamental discipline we'll become like urban politics and we're going to die. It's that simple.

Anne Schneider:

But you create a new discipline out of it.

Bryan Jones:

It's not going to happen.

Glen Krutz:

Hank and then Paul. Hank?

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

Now the thing we straddle is challenging both because we do need to have that theoretical basis, we have to have a common language; I think you're absolutely right about that, Bryan. Otherwise we have people who have to build from the ground up every time; every new foray into public policy is a completely different element. I'm really hoping we're not headed that way. But the other thing that has us drawn and quartered in many cases is that we can't do what we do without knowing substantively about the policy area that we are writing in. And I think one of the things that most exasperates me about political scientists, chiefly political scientists doing policy, is that they don't bother to learn about it, they think they know, so they say really stupid things about substantive issues that they attempt to write about in politics. And I see it over and over and over. They don't appear to want to take the time that's necessary to learn about the stuff of which you know policy is concerned.

Glen Krutz:

The one exception there is the health policy research scholars program from the Johnson Foundation

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

Yes, what's nice but unusual about that program is the two-year grounding that those scholars gain in a health policy scholarly environment.

Glen Krutz:

Paul, go ahead.

Paul Sabatier:

Couple of points: first, I don't want to get real hung up on political science's problems because I don't think we can solve them. But that's not to say we're a narrow discipline, I mean, political science is traditionally known as taking in economics, sociology, psychology, and law, okay, and that's going to continue. One of the things that is different between you and I is basically we use different parts of psychology to develop our model of the individual. And I think we ought to be really alert to essentially what's going on in those disciplines which have been previous to political science. Second point, I think the theories we deal with ought to be both basic and applied. The difference is that an applied theory has to have levers that practitioners can pull to get something to happen. I don't think we can and we should require everybody in here to be purely an applied person. I think the field needs a mixture and we have a mixture right here. Now I'll turn it over to whoever else.

Anne Schneider:

I'll just go back to the point Hank was making. Even in our own field of policy studies, when someone only knows one policy area they say things that seem completely wrong to someone who knows some other policy area. And one of the advantages I've had is working with Helen Ingram who comes out of a natural resource, water policy, environmental policy background and I've always focused on social policies, education, welfare, criminal justice. We talked past each other for three or four years before we could even find a common language. Our notions of what was wrong in our own policy areas were diametrically opposed. Learning more than one policy area has really enriched our work. Across different policy areas, problems are different, even if there are common elements. In terms of our theory we don't want to all tied up with concepts and definitions. But we have to have these or we don't even know what we're talking about. When we talk about policy content, are we talking about the same thing? Does "policy process" mean the same thing to all of us? I'd make an argument for knowing at least two policy areas.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

You need to be bilingual.

Anne Schneider:

At least bilingual. And there are specialized policy programs and schools: health policy, education policy, for example, and as Chris said, they've never heard of us, we've never heard of them. They say really strange things sometimes.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

But we don't. [laughter]

David Weimer:

While we're on the topic of discipline, I'd like to follow up a point. You know the economists are in some ways more normative than we are, it's a single value: efficiency. And I guess, where are the normative theorists here?

Anne Schneider:

A few.

David Weimer:

Where's the other one? I want to see the other one.

Anne Schneider:

Mara, Peter… [Laughter]

David Weimer:

Point of order, I rest my case. I guess my point is it seems to me that there should be more people doing normative theory and public policy than I see at least.

Chris Weible:

What do you mean by normative theory?

David Weimer:

Normative theory, I mean the people who should be thinking about what values are in democracy and what the good society is. Things that get discussed at the very abstract levels of the discipline don't seem to connect at least in my experience very well to what we do. I think this is an elaboration of your point.

Anne Schneider:

You know I spent time earlier on in my career going to APSA (the American Political Science Association) and other conferences trying to find political philosophy panels that would be relevant to my public policy work. And you don't find much there. Someone directed me toward the deliberative democracy work. But the economists at least have a set of norms.

David Weimer:

And they put them out clearly.

Anne Schneider:

And they put them out into the real world of policy-making, and we could do the same thing, it doesn't have to just be efficiency. We could focus on participation, justice, fairness, for example. These are things we agree on

even if we don't know precisely what they mean in some specific context, we agree that they're important.

Glen Krutz:
Next Larry then Sam.

Larry Lynn:
I don't think economists are at their best when they turn their science into an ideology.

Anne Schneider:
No, that's not what we meant.

David Weimer:
No that's not quite what I meant, Larry. I meant that there is general agreement that other things equal, it's better to have an efficient policy than an inefficient one. Now where they stop is other things equal. And that's where I think normative theorists should be making a contribution.

Larry Lynn:
Yeah, that's such a trivial proposition, that idea of efficiency. Other things equal, other things include so much. That's where the other disciplines come in. Other things include everything that's really interesting about the world.

David Weimer:
Exactly, but which discipline dominates in policy advice?

Larry Lynn:
I don't know. I want to pick up something that she said about, let me call them neighborhoods, across policy neighborhoods that the domains in which we have an interest, the policy focus, specialty, criminal justice, economic policy. The question that seems to me of interest is that we observe an inherent, enormous variance across these neighborhoods. Variance is the heart of social science. What accounts for, what are these differences? Why do they matter? It seems to me that, as I listen to some of the papers here, we like our neighborhoods. We're comfortable there and we like to generalize from there. We think they have both normative and descriptive significance, but the real challenge for policy theory is to figure out 'how, what is the nature of variance across these papers?', and 'what's the theoretical explanation for those differences?', and 'what are the practical implications?'. What are the prescriptive implications of policy analysts doing one thing rather than another? Go to work in an environmental agency versus a social welfare agency. As an analyst, you're going to practice differently. The whole information exchange and

process is going to be different. But this is what the theorizing should be about: there is an inherently comparative core to policy theory.

Sam Workman:

A couple comments. First of all, it seems to me that Dave may have just saved our colleagues in political theory. It seems to me that instead of ignoring normative policy theory, we should go back to our departments and see if some of our theorists want to do normative policy theory. There's no reason why they can't--it's the locus of normative evaluation in the discipline. The other thing is that I think gets lost is the substance. One of the great things about policy processes is that we talk about the substance of policies, but the second word is important too, the processes. We go over to our brother or sister discipline. Right, you can fill Oklahoma with studies on how committee X is going to vote on a given deal where we have something to contribute, and I think we should engage in just that—in the processes of all this. Yes, substance is important, there's no substitute for knowing policy, I mean this is a policy processes conference as I understand it. I mean, what we should be about is the process. We should interface with political science I mean, what they do well is institutional stuff, we know that.

Glen Krutz:

Maybe some public opinion

Anne Schneider:

Maybe participation.

Sam Workman:

I would agree with that.

Mara Sidney:

I have a sense that some people feel there is a tension between bringing a normative dimension to our work and doing rigorous scholarship and rigorous empirical inquiry, and that bothers me. I don't think that's necessarily the case. And I think part of the answer is to evaluate normatively what you're learning about and be transparent about what criteria you're using in that evaluation, and be open to other people coming up with a different conclusion. I mean, I think normative analysis should be brought in more centrally, because most of us have come to policy because we care about specific issues and we think things are wrong with society. I don't think it's a good direction to go to try to remove that impetus for studying policy. And I guess the other thing I wanted to say was building on some of what David was saying and Anne, it seems, and Peter, it seems like their aspirations in policy study are toward public scholarship, and I think that that's a positive thing. I don't think it should be something to be afraid of. I think it's also a contribution.

Tom James:

What do you mean by that? What do you mean by public scholarship?

Mara Sidney:

Engaging, you know, crossing boundaries and bringing your work out of academia into public life.

Anne Schneider:

The kind of work you (Tom James) do.

Glen Krutz:

Stéphane, you've been waiting a while over here.

Stéphane Lavertu:

Thanks. We have a very endogenous world out there, and I talked to Sam and Bryan about this yesterday. With endogenous frameworks we lose theoretical leverage. But if you have a normative premise and you make something exogenous, you might give a theory some traction. One reason why I'd like a hierarchy paper is that that's exactly what you have—you have a theory of governance of how the political process works, how it ought to work. We have representative institutions that are trying to implement policy in some way and if you use that as your anchor and work your way down, which gives you a good theory. So by having that normative premise of representation and using hierarchy you've anchored your theory. That's the problem Sam had with me yesterday. He said "Well, why have a normative premise?" I said, "Well, you have to have one or else everything else is endogenous." That doesn't mean that you have to use a hierarchy going one way. I was talking to Ken about it, and the direction can go in the other direction. You can claim that it should come from the bottom up. But you've got to pin it down somewhere and I think having a normative goal of some sort enables you to do that.

Sam Workman:

I'm reminded of an old analogy. I mean, if I were to describe this it's like a bull with its horns caught in the fence and you're trying to decide whether to finesse yourself out or tear the fencepost out of the ground. Right, and your normative anchor…

Peter DeLeon:

What? Is that political science?

Sam Workman:

Your normative anchor is just that.

Anne Schneider:

Your normative stance helps you decide what "it" is worth knowing something about. And it doesn't interfere with the objectivity of your study. If we didn't have some normative anchors of some kind we'd be studying why tables have two legs instead of four. And it wouldn't make any difference. So we all have a normative anchor. That's the "it" that we choose to study.

Paul Sabatier:

I'm going to fundamentally disagree with Anne. Everything we do has a normative anchor because at the very least we're all interested in doing good science.

Peter Deleon

No, I disagree Paul.

[Laughter]

Paul Sabatier:

We're all trying to do good work that seeks a better understanding of the world.

Anne Schneider:

I wouldn't argue about why that's a good normative anchor, but it certainly is one.

Paul Sabatier:

So we have that as a minimum. Okay, the danger is in my view, for people who do empirical work that is mediated by a very strong normative filter is that in fact they're going to have more than the usual problems in terms of seeing only part of the world because they're going to see only the part of the world that's of normative concern to them. Okay, and at least, I think, I mean, if somebody wants to do that's fine. I'm just saying I think that Anne is being naive in terms of assuming that the potential filters don't get very strong when you have a really strong normative premise.

The person that looks like the model in this discussion is Lin Ostrom. Lin has side-by-side essentially a fairly elaborate positive framework and/or theory in some cases, and she has a host of normative concerns, your basically traditional economic ones. 90% of her work I think can be interpreted without the normative stuff in it at all. And I think that's, but she has the normative criteria there when she wants to use them. And I think that's about the right mixture.

Anne Schneider:

Well I'm not quite sure where you're going with that, because if I have some kind of ideological preference, say, for privatization and I go out and select my studies in such a way as to show privatization works and I skew my data, then of course that's not what I'm talking about. We choose things to study because they're normatively important. You've chosen subsystems for some reason and I have a hunch that it's not just because-- like the mountain-- it was there. You had some curiosity: you wanted to know why they work, how they work. I think you probably have a normative base for that. I'm interested in policy design. And I started out doing a lot of evaluation work. I was interested in program design. I wanted to know what programs did. Some programs I liked from an intuitive point of view but I wanted to know what the results were. What were the effects on people, on institutions, on kids, on families? What were the actual effects? And my normative stance did not impact my ability to make an objective assessment. We choose something to study because normatively we think it's important. Most of us, in the social sciences do that.

Chris Weible:

We really have to distinguish real quickly between motivation and norms. They're not the same.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

One of the common aspects of environmental policy debates that Paul and I have seen is that there are norms that are often not explicit on the part of the participants. One of the places that I've seen this most interestingly is in egalitarian participatory norms colliding with hierarchical delegatory representative norms. Both of them tend to have built-in, implicit theories of democracy and representation. And the problem is that in my view, so often because they are implicit, these theories are bound to fail. I'll give you an example in environmental policy: we've had much experimentation with setting up local advisory boards and citizen groups that are given the perception that they have real clout, and then mowed over by changes that come down in a hierarchical political structure. The assumption that was made by the people who set them up, that somehow they could be autonomous from the hierarchical structure in which they were embedded, was a real disservice to the people who were involved. And in some cases it's worked because by happenstance they haven't had that collision yet, but I have been yelled at by county commissioners who tell me that they were elected by their constituencies and they have to stand for election on the basis of what they do, and here are these so-called citizen activists who have been appointed to these boards who get to somehow represent. And this is the kind of stuff – embedded and implicit theories of representation – that I think that we need to be concerned with.

I was kind of surprised that you didn't describe yourself as a normative theorist, Larry, because you're a Madisonian, and that is a norm in the sense that you're talking about.

Larry Lynn:

Let me address that, because yes I am and I wrote a normative book about how should public officials behave themselves in a Madisonian world; it was a set of normative standards that we set up. But there's still this basic question about how does the world work in a positive sense? Take networks. The big topic is networks; they are put forward as a normative proposition that the world ought to be that way and equally put forward as a positive proposition that the world is that way. Now I don't happen to think the world is that way. I think the world is more hierarchical but that's a positive statement. How does the world work? Now, off of one's positive science one can introduce a whole set of normative concerns. How do I make the world work differently? How do I introduce more pandemic democracy, to use Peter's term? How do I have a more networked world, a world in which hierarchy tends to defeat networks and other consociational arrangements? Those are normative concerns. They require positive science to be answered. So it's not that normative. It's a matter of keeping, as Paul said, it's understanding when we're doing positive science and when we are using the findings of our positive science to engage substantive issues, normative issues. That's not, that's too rarely the way we think.

Ashley Jochim:

I agree with Larry. What we're talking about here is balance between our normative and positive concerns and I think we need to do a better job of drawing out the normative implications of our theories. But in the end we're social scientists and we should be leaning towards positive science while keeping this relevance question in mind. Political science in general hasn't done a very good job of drawing out the normative implications. But in the end, we should be leaning toward positive science. That's what makes us social scientists.

Danielle Varda:

I think I'll have to confess that I haven't been in a room with political scientists before like this. I'm working at RAND right now so maybe I will rock the boat a little here too, but this is what we do every day is work on policy analysis on relevant issues. And sitting here since yesterday not only has it occurred to me that no one in their academic departments are using these theories, but I've never seen anyone at RAND ever refer to one of these theories in their analysis. I think when I look at going towards a theory of collaborative policy networks it's not actually because I think the world should be networked it's because I'm reacting to the way

that I see the agencies, the clients and the foundations. The work that we're doing is supporting this because this is the way society is today. For example, we work for the VA, and the VA has said "Look, we think we need to work with these other agencies." This is a huge cultural change for the VA. The VA has always said "we need to be self-sustaining. We need to have an institution where we can provide for our veterans without the help of others." And all of a sudden they've hired us to help them think about this. So as an academic and someone who does think about theory, I think it's my role to say, "well, I don't want to lead you blindly so let me help advance this theory and lead with some construction around it." And so I'm sitting back, honestly confessing that this is kind of new to me to think that we would consider doing any of this without considering the relevance to actual policy and how people might use it.

Mike Jones:

I think that's an incredible program.

Glen Krutz:

I think that's pretty incredible; that's the third junior scholar in a row.

David Weimer:

I decided I've talked too much and someone else should go.

[Several people talking at once]

Mike Jones:

I think it goes back to that old question: when a tree falls in a forest and nobody's there to see it, did it really happen? And as much of an honor as it is to be in this room with these people, I'm not sure that a lot of people outside this room know who the hell you people are. And that's an interesting point. And I think this links quite well with your point, when you're talking about we should lean towards…

Larry Lynn:

You should look at our book sales. [Laughter] Nobody knows who I am.

Mike Jones:

The fact that we have focused or tried to focus so much on being objective and describing the process and not injecting our values into it means that I think the information is put out there and is used by people that find it useful in pursuing their agendas. So if we don't pursue our own agenda then we do that at the risk of somebody else using us for that end. And I think that ties well with your point that we need to have some sort of end. And if I were to propose an end maybe something like holding government accountable, talking more about winners and losers

specifically we don't necessarily have to take a stance on how we feel about those winners and losers but just if we identify them.

Anne Schneider:
And expose, unmask, so people can actually see.

Mike Jones:
Yes, deconstruct.

Anne Schneider:
Deconstruct. There you go.

Chris Weible:
I like the discussion. I just don't know, in terms of what he (Michael Jones) said, I believe in a pluralistic approach, that is a division of labor and of the talent. I focus on theory, which often is not a practical exercise. It is somewhat equivalent to making better hammers but not actually building something with the hammers. At some point in my career I may go out and use a hammer and try building houses, but right now I'm in the business of making better hammers; that is making better theories. And I'm happy doing that.

Tom James:
I agree, obviously 100%, given what I do, and Chris kind of came to this point somewhat yesterday also. What I thought yesterday is that I don't want to go in there (to today's session) and say what you just said; I want to go in there and tell these folks that although my students read all of your works in my pro-seminars and so on and we discuss it in class, it's of little utility to me on a day-to-day basis. It's meaningless until I get to the point sometimes where a user says okay, I mean, there's your advice for the policy analysis or here's what the findings are from the evaluations and our cumulative knowledge what do you think we ought to do here and then maybe coalitions come to mind. Well if you want to move this, here's the normative direction you want to go with the policy and you need to mobilize folks. Here's some theoretical foundation that may help you do that, but it doesn't help me on a day-to-day basis until I get up to that point which is why I was saying yesterday. Why isn't policy analysis, or why aren't policy analysis and program evaluation as key pieces of this process, not only the information they generate, but the process of conducting the studies, often even more important than the results of the study, because of what it forces the ultimate users to confront about their normative expectations and what they're really trying to do because of the questions I've forced them to answer through the process of conducting the study. So why aren't these things in the theories, and what can I do to help that?

Glen Krutz:

I think there are a lot of people going through MPA programs now that are reading a lot of this work in a way that maybe they weren't 15, 20 years ago. Erik was next, then Larry.

Erik Godwin:

Where would you put me? I have a hard time understanding how to move within the policy area within political science and get tenure. I was just reliably informed that if I publish only in PA (public administration) and public policy journals my time at Texas A&M will be brief. And you know I got an MPP (Master of Public Policy) from the University of Michigan about 10 years ago. Out of 18 courses I took one in political science and it was ethics. The rest of them were econ (economics) and stat (statistics)-based, every one of them. When I applied at public policy schools and PA schools for jobs this year, they wanted to know which courses I could teach. They didn't want to hear about interest groups. They didn't want to hear about policy. They wanted to hear about program evaluation. They wanted to hear about benefit-cost. They wanted to hear about statistics 1 & 2 and econometrics. I'm a young scholar; I'd love to know how to survive. And one of the questions that I have concerns public policy; RAND, you're working in a public policy school. Where am I going to find a home where I can get to sit in this room to debate the larger issues? I have to get there first, and in order to do that I have to publish, and I have to publish in the right places, and for me that's going to be political science journals. And you know, normative concerns are difficult to get into AJPS (The American Journal of Political Science), APSR (American Political Science Review), or JOP (Journal of Politics). It's hard for me. The rest of you will have an easier time maybe, but I'm not brilliant enough to pull it off effectively without some sort of guidance as to how to construct policy in a way that's palatable to political science at large. It's true that I shouldn't be concerned about what political science is. Well that's not true. I have to be concerned about political science because I'm in a rung. You know one of the most fruitful zones in the world in terms of diversity is the shoreline, right. We've all heard this. Well, you know political science is the ocean and I have to worry that the red tide is coming for me, right. So it's great to live there and I love it there, you know. But after 10 years, and after 10 years of doing it, program evaluation for OMB and lobbying and for the agencies, I didn't read anything coming out of political science. And you know now I'm in the process of trying to produce information that's useful to people in large scales but I also really don't want to tell my wife that I failed as an academic. And so, you know in 8 years' time I'd like to have the wider-based concerns, but I also want to know, 'where would you put me?' Is it political science? Do I go to policy schools? Am I going to make it at A&M? Right? I mean that's a mixed blessing.

Glen Krutz:

We got Bryan then we…

Larry Lynn:

I thought I was next, but you want to respond?

Bryan Jones:

I'll yield the floor to you if you'll yield it back to me.

Larry Lynn:

I will. This may sound like a flippant answer but go to public policy schools, go to PA schools, that's what they're, professional schools values, what you're doing. Publish in JPART, publish in JPPAM, publish in Public Management Review.

Multiple people:

Policy Studies Journal.

Larry Lynn:

And of course the Policy Studies Journal. You can get tenure doing that, but not in a political science department.

Erik Godwin:

But a lot of you moved from polisci, a lot of you. I don't know all your histories, but a lot of you moved from what I would call I think, sort of, the firmly rooted disciplines. You moved from there and went into policy, going the other direction is hard. How many political science departments will look at somebody who got tenure at a policy school and say oh, automatically yes?

Bryan Jones:

I find this discussion shocking because I can't imagine anybody admitting that they do applied economics without knowing fundamental economic theory. It's embarrassing that we have a bunch of applied people who say we don't read this stuff. And maybe we're not good enough yet, but that's an embarrassing thing to say. The second thing I want to say, wait a minute. The second thing I want to say is my God read Keynes, the, you may not be reading this but I guarantee it's in the ether. In the same way that Keynes said every politician is going, I can't remember the quote, but he's basing his action on the theories of some dead economist or political philosopher. And I would, and what's wrong with public policy schools, why I went to Wayne State and took over the chairmanship there. I pulled down a book and the book was called Letters on Public Administration it was written by a man named Lent Upson. Now let me tell you a little bit…

Ken Meier:

Yes, I thought I was the only other person who read that book.

Bryan Jones:

Well you're not. What's interesting in public administration is we don't realize where they come from—our public policy schools. Public administration programs came out of the Progressive reform movements, municipal research bureaus, and Upson went to the municipal bureau in Detroit, it was a very early one, and set up the Public Administration at Wayne State it was one of the first ones in the country. And he wrote these letters in the 40s and 50s to his students, and he said this in the first essay that he said in all of them. I don't want you to waste your time with personnel management, budgeting, or I suppose he would say the techniques of programming, stat and that kind of stuff, that I don't think he would have objected to, because he had stat courses in his program real early. But his point was I want you to learn about economy, the society, governance, I want you to focus on outcomes. Those are the two things he told his students. And all that technical stuff, he said, you can learn that on the job in a few weeks. So I think in a way our policy schools have become so technical and so uninteresting and not about, Larry is the kind of scholar that ought to be in policy schools. He talks about politics, governance, and institutions, and he knows about economics. So, my God, these are the kind of people who should be running our schools instead of…

Hank Jenkins-Smith

…technocrats.

Bryan Jones:

Moving out, and leaving. We'd have a lot better policy analysts if we had those kinds of people rather than people that tell me we never read this stuff.

Glen Krutz:

We'll let Tom respond, then Hank.

Tom James:

I can't speak for what goes on at RAND, but I for one did not say we don't read it.

Bryan Jones:

I heard you say that.

Tom James:

No, I did not say that.

Bryan Jones:

No I heard you say you did read it.

Tom James:

And the colleagues that in my background.

Bryan Jones:

Didn't like it.

Tom James:

It's not that I didn't like it, I'm just trying to figure out how I fit in there is all I'm saying. The colleagues who are in my formal and informal networks around the country that I associate with on national projects and so on do read this stuff. In fact I sent an email to one of them the other day saying no, I can't be on a conference call, I'm in a meeting and I named some of the folks that were going to be here, I thought the guy was going to fly out here and crash the meeting. No, we do know about what you write, we talk about it, but we also talk about how we fit in here, where's our little niche and how can that inform what we're doing and how can what we're doing inform what you're doing. That's, that was my only point.

Bryan Jones:

And that's why policy fields…

Glen Krutz:

Hank and then Larry.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

I'll be quiet for now.

Larry Lynn:

I think I want to address that. I used to spend a lot of time hanging out with foundation types, and the foundation people have definite ideas. They have normative ideas. That's what they do. And their ideas, they're put into . . . they're funded, and one of the things they love is collaborations and networks. And my experience is that the great majority of people who fund these types of projects think that collaboration is a hearts-and-minds issue. Collaboration is about wanting to. It's about believing in it. It's never a structural issue. It's never a question of organizing for collaboration. It's never a question of governance. I think it's a fundamental error. I think one of the ways we advise the real world is from our science of understanding the importance of organizational arrangements, the importance of the institutional setup, the importance of governance. It's not just a hearts-and-minds issue, but it's a hard point to get across but it's the kinds of things that we ought to be bringing to the

real world and can bring to the real world if our positive science is good enough, but it's you know, it's got to be that good and it can be. But then I think it has immediate implications for the world reaction.

Paul Sabatier:

I think that, when I think about what motivates me, it's out of a passion for trying to understand the world. I really don't care whether it's of any use to anybody. My passion is trying to understand the world. Somebody's paying me to do that, somebody. Other people are listening, and every once in a while I get a letter from somebody saying I like your stuff. And I think we need to recognize that there's a diversity of careers here, and not everybody fits the same damn mold. I mean, it's not going to happen anyway. So we shouldn't even try.

Peter DeLeon:

You mean I can't be like Ken Meier? [Laughter]

Paul Sabatier:

No, you can't be like Ken Meier.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

Mara and I were having a conversation about this yesterday. I actually think that it is important to have different people doing different kinds of things, that we can't all be doing the same work. I think what bothers me, however, is when people engaged in doing public policy from within the political science discipline or any other trap themselves into thinking that their ideological perspective is so obviously right that they don't even need to examine it. That happens with such frequency. In the case of nuclear politics, which is one of the three or four areas that I've worked in pretty extensively, the network of policy scholars grew up around a controversy. The state of Nevada had a lot of money that they got from the federal government to evaluate the social impact of nuclear waste on the state. They hired a bunch of scholars to demonstrate that the costs of storing spent fuel in Nevada, including the social impacts, were going to be huge. And they found people who were reasonably ideologically congenial who are also very good scholars and built an amazing stockpile of scholarship. Now the Department of Energy did not engage likewise, they just kept writing the social science questions off as unimportant. But what happened was an infusion of an ideological perspective into the literature in a way that is really remarkable. And part of it originates from a rejection of hierarchical systems for making decisions, a states' rights kind of perspective, a sense of the federal government having committed injustice, which gets further tangled up in something that I think everybody here probably hit at one point or another. And that is the idea that getting money or contracts for work with the federal government is bad, that our government is somehow tainted or evil, and therefore we shouldn't get engaged in helping our government make better choices.

And you know, I hear this argument and it's pretty broadly spread in our field, and that is I think completely wrong. That is something I object to. Now that's different than saying that we shouldn't be approaching the question from different bases, that there shouldn't be explicit norms that are tested, that are evaluated for whether the institutions do this or whether they should do that. But it's the implicitness of it. The danger for us is that we get involved in questions that raise passions because we are working on things that matter, and that makes the challenge of not getting sucked into an implicit ideological dispute more difficult for us than I think it is for many other fields. That's our dilemma, and I think it perpetuates itself in the way we train our graduate students.

Glen Krutz:

Let's see, I think Anne, you had your...

Anne Schneider:

Maybe this is off the subject, but I remember reading the book by Lindblom and Cohen, Cohen and Lindblom, whichever it was, "Usable Knowledge." And it just infuriated me. I thought that book claimed that social science produced no usable knowledge. The only useful knowledge, they said, was … what was it?

Peter DeLeon:

PSI, professional something index.

Anne Schneider:

What they didn't pay attention to, and I think, Tom, this goes back to one of the things you were saying, is that what we find in our research after a while may become common knowledge. But it takes a long time. Paul some of the work you've done has been very useful, but it takes a long time for the knowledge that we produce or the norms that we're talking about to begin to seep into general knowledge. It bothers me that when we talk about normative theory, someone immediately jumps to the conclusion that we're talking about ideology, or a left-right ideological debate. That's not what we're talking about. We have, as policy scholars, expanded the range of outcomes that are important. We do include benefits and costs, efficiencies, and effectiveness. I have also emphasized fairness, perceptions of fairness, production of social capital, neighborhood improvement, and whether programs actually make a difference in whether the people thought government was helpful or treated them well. I have looked at income disparity in terms of crime-reducing programs and middle class bias in juvenile court outcomes. No one objected to including these in evaluation studies. They just hadn't thought of them yet as dimensions of outcomes. When we talk about normative concerns, we're not talking about ideology. We're talking about the range of outcomes that we include in our studies.

Danielle Varda:

Well I just wanted to comment, I agree with Hank, and I think what I find interesting and embarrassing to use the word embarrassing, is that right away, I think your response to me was to put us in different boxes. And I think it's so interesting to me, because I don't think I'm that different from you in what I do and what I think and what my goals are terms of theory and where I want to go with that. What maybe makes us different, and is I'm different from Paul, is that he only wants to learn how the world works, I do care if others want to use that knowledge or not and apply it. And I don't think there's anything that different though about where we come from to start with, we're all kind of in the same box here. And I guess I just…

Bryan Jones:

We put our pants on one leg at a time.

Danielle Varda:

We do. And you know, and whether I've read the theory, you know of course I've read everyone's work here, I came from schools where we did this, and I just think that for me I wonder then if we do want if we don't care if people are using it or not, but if we do, how do, I wonder how we're not curious about how we just better communicate that to others. And lastly just want to say that in my work I always try to keep my skeptics as close as possible either in my applied work or not. I was talking to Anne about this. There's some stuff I've done and people have said "I'm not going to buy into that. That's just wrong." And I've said "please join my advisory group." You know, like, "please be on board with me, I need you to be better at what I do." And so I just hope we can, and maybe I sound too touchy-feely, but I just I don't think I'm that different from you in what we're doing.

Ken Meier:

Let me raise a slightly different question because, when I was invited to come here I of course said no. I said no because I said I haven't been doing any policy for years, and then you know I was badgered and well you know I kept thinking I've used various of these policy theories at various times in my life. I just, I don't think I have a dog in this fight. Now, [multiple people making jokes, laughter, woofing] but here's the but part, is what would convince me I have a dog in this fight would be if everybody who's doing these policy theories spun out what they thought was the most interesting theoretical question that their theory is dealing with and why it's going to break the field wide open. And that could get me excited and I could move out of public management and back into policy theory. Then I'd have a dog in the fight.

David Weimer:

I'm not sure I want to make a mundane comment after that. You know our, I've always thought one of the problems in comparative politics has been the inability of individual scholars to gain command of a large number of, the details of a large number of countries. One solution to that, is seeing more and more collaborative efforts where there's some agreement on a general framework that's going to be employed by experts in particular countries and then come back and ask what can we make of that variation that Larry's pointed to and Anne is pointing to. And I think we have a similar problem in the policy process because it is difficult for any one of us to master more than a few deep substantive fields in any meaningful way. And I guess this is a sociological comment. What could we do maybe as a policy subfield within political science? What could we do to figure out ways of connecting individual scholars so that our work is more parallel so that we can take advantage of those variations and discover those variations across the field and make some assessment of it? Now you might say theory is one possibility for doing that, right? We have a well-recognized theory. We all go out and apply it, try to test that theory and apply it or whatever in our own areas of expertise. But we don't have one theory, right. Maybe advocacy coalition comes closest to the thing that is used in a recognizable form across a large number of areas, but I'm not sure where I'm going with this. I guess where I'm going you know is that if you take Larry's point, Anne's point that there's something to be learned from variation but as individual scholars we typically cannot do much looking across, then we have a collective problem of figuring out a way to organize so that we, our work is more than the sum of individual case studies.

Glen Krutz:

Right here. All right well, Hank you want to do a short break?

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

Yeah, let's take about 15 minutes.

After break

Glen Krutz:

Alright [remarks covered by others talking]. Before we go to, there are people who raised their hands and so forth, Warren wanted to describe a model he was working on at West Virginia.

Warren Eller:

I'm going to give you a proposition. I'm going to give you the proposition that there is a better form for what we do and we should not look toward political science and look at ourselves as a subfield of political science. We're exactly the opposite: political science is a subfield of public policy. [Covered by laughter] West Virginia University had a program there of political science where everybody is in a field of public policy, you can do comparative public policy, you could do American institutions public policy. But I think one of the things we've talked about a lot and Erik touched on it is the structure of the way we do our business, and maybe our business should be that we are a field of policy and that sociology, political science, these are all the things that fall into as subdivisions of our field. Erik, do you have any comments on that since you actually brought us around to it? Or do you have a mouthful of food?

Erik Godwin:
Peanut butter's not going away for a second. [Laughter]

Warren Eller:
Larry?

Larry Lynn:
This is the way it all started, the policy analysis movement back in the 60s when Tom Shelling and Fred Mosteller, and John Dunlop and Charlie Hitch created the Kennedy School, and Dick Neustadt, the triple-AS got into it there was no monograph on public policy or policy analysis as at least the integrator of all the social sciences and as an effect a meta-discipline and there was a great excitement about the potential for doing exactly that. I think the conclusion is that that never happened, but this is an idea that's a couple of generations old.

Bryan Jones:
Lasswell's policy sciences.

Larry Lynn:
There's that, there's Lasswell as well.

David Weimer:
Maybe if you looked at the public administration history vis-à-vis political science you would see the same sort of thing.

Bryan Jones:
You would.

David Weimer:
One point I've always liked to make, the senior political scientists who I learned from all did public administration as a field, William Riker, Aaron

Wildavsky, they all did, Dick Fenno, they all political science as a main field, but we've got to see public administration as a field and yet I don't, you know, I don't see.

Ken Meier:
How many people here have a field in public administration?

Erik Godwin:
Does that include policy?

Multiple:
No. We said public administration.

Alisa Hicklin:
There's so few programs that even offer it anymore.

Ken Meier:
Two hundred and sixty.

Alisa Hicklin:
So few political science programs, I mean political science doctoral programs that offer public administration as a field.

Ken Meier:
MPA programs are 260.

Glen Krutz:
The next we're going to throw out to you, maybe we'll get Ken Meier to have a dog in the hunt after all.

Bryan Jones:
Hunt not a fight, you used the wrong metaphor by the way, not a fight it's a hunt, Glen got it right.

Glen Krutz:
This was in the discussion a little bit yesterday, somewhat implicitly, can or should we include the role of management in policy theory? Or is management something that can be in the error term, so to speak?

Peter DeLeon:
That was the problem.

[Laughter, chattering]

Peter DeLeon:

I mean that's the problem that Hargrove raised. Is management implementation the missing link? And the answer of course it's not. I mean there are just so many issues that are tied up in doing something once you admit having the foggiest idea what you're doing so you can't exclude management, if management is at all synonymous with implementation.

Chris Weible:

I was going to say that these are interesting questions then great; do it. I have a lot of colleagues who have accused me of not knowing organizational theory. In fact the ACF largely ignores the organizational theory literature, and I'm like yeah, if you want to help bringing that into the ACF, try it. I'm not going to do it at this point in time.

Anne Schneider:

From a policy design point of view, management has to be part of it. When thinking about policy content, one of the issues is how much discretion managers have and what kind of limits there are, the kind of institution they are working in is important. All of those are actually created by policies. So the idea that you can somehow take management out of it and still think you can make sense of what you're doing doesn't make any sense to me. The manager, the street-level bureaucrat, every person who is a part of that policy arena, that policy content, that design, has to be a part of what we talk about. How could we take out the people? We would have no engine left.

Ashley Jochim:

At least from a student perspective, when you're learning about public policy as a student, you wonder "these are great theories what can I do with them?" And I think that's where management comes in and says you can make a difference, you can impact the outcomes of policies. Whether you're in an agency or you're in a public policy institution somehow your decision has an effect on the outcome. So we can't ignore these questions and we need to think about the connections between policy design and management.

Alisa Hicklin:

My frustration in discussing the role of management in policy theory generally is because, as always there are certain terms that become associated with certain literatures, right. And so whenever we say management a lot of times we think about bureaucratic management that we see in public administration literatures and I think that's too narrow of a focus. That there are so many interesting applications and we talk about variations in why some coalitions fail and others succeed and a lot of times there are individuals that matter in that and it's their individual skill

and their ability to bring resources together in a way that's more than just institutional structural sort of issues that there's kind of a individual behavioral aspect to that that we might be able to integrate systematically into our understanding about who controls information and how it's prioritized and those types of things. And so again, my frustration is that I think if we think of management broadly there are some really interesting applications to the theories that we're talking about but sometimes they get too pigeon-holed.

Larry Lynn:

This, there's a textbook about to come out that's going to make this point brilliantly.

Alisa Hicklin:

I've read a little bit of it, it's great.

Bryan Jones:

Who wrote it Larry?

[Laughter]

Larry Lynn:

Management is institutions, management is organizations and management is individuals, actors in roles and positions. All three of them. That's what makes it a really fascinating, interesting, and kind of intellectually challenging. It's all three of those things. And that's, you know, organizational theory has got to be in some of it, has got to be part of the study of public policy. But it has three dimensions and we can't do without any one of them. We can't do without them.

Bryan Jones:

One of the problems with, I love these conceptions of management that all three of you brought here because it makes complete sense to me the ties to theories and action. The problem I have seen in too many policy schools, and maybe Ashley can speak to this as she actually takes these courses is that it's devolved into a series of techniques that have nothing to do with what Larry calls governance, which I think is embedded in this three-components thing. You have to understand I've designed institutions, how organizations work, and there's an individual effectiveness component. I don't think the first two are in the concept of many public management schools. And the management strategies have devolved into a series of techniques rather than something broader.

Larry Lynn:

Well you're thinking of Bob Behn, and we don't think like Bob Behn.

Bryan Jones:

I'm thinking of what courses I'm getting complaints on from my graduate students.

Mara Sidney:

Maybe this is self-evident but I guess I was just thinking that as long as management is not construed exclusively as government, because obviously management today involves both non-profit and private sector organizations managing or implementing public policy, and I think it just needs to be sure to go beyond government in Washington.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

I could imagine a class that took seriously the ACF, punctuated equilibrium, institutional rational choice models that would attempt to provide, for people who are going to be in the policy process, the theoretical structures and then identify the things to look for in practice. In punctuated equilibrium theory you're obviously looking at the issue areas for which you're responsible, you have to know how to monitor what's going on with the tension, to see when the policy image is under attack. In the ACF you'd have to understand what is a subsystem, how do you build them, how do you inhibit them, how do they interact, what's their relationship to institutions. That would actually provide the traction for somebody who's going to be out there in those systems to think conceptually for purposes of action within a subsystem. I haven't seen such a course, but it would be the sort of thing that bridges the concept development and the relationships that we're identifying with people who have to get out there and do stuff. And I don't see why that can't happen. That would be a different sort of substantive domain of public administration rather than just thinking about personnel or organizational structures. Rather in a way that fits what happens when practitioners get out there, I think that would be a promising development.

Bryan Jones:

There is one area that's been done in and we've forgotten it and to some degree, it's the policy streams stuff. That's what they all read if they read a policy process book in public management schools. It's the Kingdon book. It actually, he sailed around in a sailboat and now he calls it the "Academic Freedom" and it's all embroiled in that book. But it's metaphorical and hard to, I don't think impossible, but hard to get the sort of empirical rigor that Paul pushes and Hank and all of us. And so we don't use it as much.

Ken Meier:

I'm always curious as to how this whole experiment is going to play out cause when a bunch of us got together and decided management should be a social science and you know Larry put out a book that said yeah, maybe

it could be a social science, and then we said yeah, and not quite the way Larry wants it but it could be. And then we just started producing students, and you know what we found is that all schools of public affairs want at least one of these people. It's actually kind of exciting to say okay, here's a phenomenon nobody has studied and you can do it with the tools that social science learned, and you can measure management, you can measure it's quality, you can measure it's scope, you know all of these things, and that's why you know maybe it has always been in the error term. This is an attempt to pull it back, and the real question is I think is whether the people we're sending out now are going to continue to reproduce.

Glen Krutz:
Anybody else on this one? What about institutions?

Larry Lynn:
We answered those, right?

Hank Jenkins-Smith:
The error term is now very small.

Larry Lynn:
I'm going to make sure the tape says we answered those.

Glen Krutz:
The role of institutions in public policy and network theory. We can view institutions as interactive as moderating, as filters...

Peter DeLeon:
We're going to need a definition of institutions.

Anne Schneider:
Well, I'd start at a little different place, depending on what we mean by institutions. Do we mean everything? Do we mean all processes, all rules, all practices? Do we think of institutions as actual concrete things that we can get our arms around? Policies create institutions and policies are created within institutions. Policies both create them and are created within them.

Glen Krutz:
This is the kind of thing we were talking about last week, and there are quite a few public policy analysts who don't listen to the papers and there's not much about institutions. And just like you said institutions, policies create institutions, but institutions also direct attention, some of what Bryan's done, toward some policy areas and not others.

Anne Schneider:

It’s very interactive. But it’s also moderating, it’s also filtering. It’s really all of them.

Chris Weible:

In some situations the institutions create a subsystem where most things happen. Paul and I were talking about how sometimes subsystems exist because of institutions or a piece of legislation, which created an organization that has a scope of responsibility that embeds it in that issue area. And without the institutions the whole subsystem would vanish.

Larry Lynn:

By the way I trust that this question is hardly unrelated to the previous question; it’s not that management and institutions are separate subjects, right, management is part of institutions.

[Several talking at once]

Chris Weible:

We don’t get credit for answering both of them.

Peter DeLeon:

Sorry Larry, we don’t give partial credit.

Larry Lynn:

Yes you do, actually.

Glen Krutz:

That’s all on institutions?

Ken Meier:

At least you didn’t say that institutions are just in the error term.

Bryan Jones:

Well, there is one component here that gets back to Larry’s point about hierarchy versus networks, and I don’t think we just mean like Hank’s hierarchy. I’m a little worried about something we didn’t address in the theory question is because we got on a very interesting motivation about normative issues. But there’s a second element of theoretical perspectives and it will direct you toward a certain conception of the world that you then find in your data, and my favorite bug-a-boo on this is the principal-agent stuff. Principal-agent takes the interesting but not, for god’s sake, not the be all and end all of delegation questions and makes it central to public administration as it is pursued in political science and to that end the rewards structure gets put into this, as Erik was pointing out, and if you don’t you probably get principal-agent theory and think preferences

are different between bureaucrats and politicians. And then you can't get ahead in the field. But why would you ever start with that assumption anyway? Why does anybody—we go out and talk to bureaucrats, Tom does, Hank, all of us to some extent and they don't strike me as sitting around saying how can I get around these goddamn principals that I want to subvert or I'm going to be lazy and not do my job. I mean that just doesn't strike me the way school teachers and firemen and policemen act. And go read (Donald) Yates if you want to find out how policemen act on the job and they don't look like that. So why do we keep writing about this? We've directed ourselves to one part of the institutional structure, the hierarchy that is embedded, because we like democratic accountability, we like that top-down model, and it doesn't matter how the world works, that drives how we think about things, so that's the attention directing question, very different from the normative question built into the incentive structure that drives how we think about public administration and probably anybody that around to make suggestions about it would say no, you need this hierarchy system, you don't want a bunch of bureaucrats doing what they shouldn't be doing, and that is making policy recommendations.

Peter DeLeon:

Isn't that the driving idea behind network theory so we can begin to describe what those look like graphically, conceptually?

Bryan Jones:

Network theory would be the opposite of hierarchy, wouldn't it?

Peter DeLeon:

Doesn't have to be.

Ken Meier:

To answer Bryan's question why they do this I can bet no political scientist has gone back to economics and read agency theory, because agency theory is only interesting because of the agent. If the agent didn't act and didn't have discretion there's nothing there. And so we get a group of political scientists who want to say something about bureaucracy without studying it. And that's why in my mind it just hasn't generated many interesting things. In fact if you start from the other perspective and you look at the agent, then this becomes an interesting question.

David Weimer:

Could I say, Stéphane's probably too modest to say this, but his dissertation as I understand it at this point…

Stéphane Lavertu:

That's not a good sign.

David Weimer:

He's trying to turn the contract design question around. In what circumstances does the agent actually design the contract participate in the, is fully strategic in structuring the circumstances of control and discretion. Is that still your dissertation?

Stéphane Lavertu:

Yes, it is now. [Laughter]

Paul Sabatier:

Is that the amount of empirical work that's going into this question?

Stéphane Lavertu:

The motivation came from reading this stuff, the stuff you guys produce, and being embedded in a discipline that doesn't read it. And I don't think you need to throw the principal-agent framework away to get those insights in there. I don't believe principal-agent models necessarily have a narrow view of the way agents behave. I don't think models necessarily assume agents want to shirk… I think models have become more powerful; in some, agent preferences are more induced by their surroundings. If you're away from your mom for long enough you're going to stop doing what she was telling you to do. And it's not because people are… it's not just that public administrators are trying to shirk. It's the nature of their circumstances. I think most of your scholarship acknowledges that, right? They have distinct preferences, and it's not necessarily because they're trying to undermine anyone, it's often because they're trying to please too many people.

Larry Lynn:

Well let me, this question of hierarchy, you imply that anybody who, as long as hierarchy does it, is a normative proposition, no far from it.

Bryan Jones:

No I didn't say that at all, and if I did it was a stupid thing to say. That guy didn't say that. Whoever that was didn't say that.

Larry Lynn:

The assertion, the argument for hierarchy, is that it is the way the world works. And you know there's a favorite saying of mine, if fish were social scientists they wouldn't discover water.

Ken Meier:

But how would they put their pants on?

Chris Weible:
With their fins.

David Weimer:
One fin at a time.

Larry Lynn:
Often the thing that is most ubiquitous is the thing that is the hardest to understand its importance. Republican hierarchy, republican institutions because they're hierarchical and ubiquitous. Agents are not free agents. Ask anybody about the reasons they do what they do. It has something to do with laws, it has something to do with regulations, it has something to do with the mission of the agency. Now how that's modified by different types of relationships, socialization, organizational cultures, is a fascinating set of issues. But it's a modification of something that one could argue on the basis of evidence that is the backbone of an administrative system, running down through the chain of agents into the private sector.

Bryan Jones:
But you have a concept of hierarchy and maybe the Wisconsin crew is right, maybe I've got too capsulated a view of principal-agent theory, but principal-agent theory says all of the preferences are not in the laws, not in the mission of the agencies, all the preferences are in the principal and the agent.

Dave Weimer:
No, no, no, the contract that is designed is the content of the regulations, the rules, norms.

Larry Lynn:
Yes. By the way, if you don't think that there are agents, Antonin Scalia, and Sandra Day O'Connor both declared that in effect there is no delegation, they're all agents. So the Supreme Court has enforced the principal-agent model whether we like it or not.

Edella Schlager:
I think the problem with the focus on hierarchy is not hierarchy itself, it's that it's only in one direction. We only look at it from the principal down to the street-level bureaucrat.

Larry Lynn:
No we don't.

Edella Schlager:

But the emphasis is definitely on that subject.

Larry Lynn:

Most investigators do that but it's not implicit in the model. It's a psychological necessity to start somewhere.

Ken Meier:

The other place where if we could still interest political scientists in this, is that I find Gary Miller's work on this fascinating because he raises the question about cheating on behalf of the principal. And it's quite clear, principals cheat all the time.

Bryan Jones:

And they're corrupt and they ask agents to do things that are against the law.

David Weimer:

An elaboration to the great model.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

But that's exactly where the normative thing came up. The idea was that the real problem is making agents act like principals, getting them to behave, and that's the good thing. It's good to have a tighter linkage. And that's an implicit normative claim which I think got stuck in there and has become the basis of an awful lot of literature, and if you read that stuff you'd come out of it thinking well, principal-agent relationships work to the extent that the principal can force an agent to behave as they want. But I'm not sure that that's true.

Stéphane Lavertu:

I think Hank has a good point though, because I struggled with this in the paper because you want to define the positive theory of delegation in such a way that you don't spill over into normative prescriptions in another way, right. So we know that legislators attempt to restrict discretion by structuring organizations, creating rules, making narrow statutes and all these sorts of things, but we know that they're not always very good at it. That people are able to circumvent these structures, but the normative premise you have to take from this model is 'how can we make it so that we have as much information as possible?' or you know 'how do you structure organizations to meet the needs that you're talking about?' How do we get the right people at the table, how do we get the right information at the table? Are they working against each other or are they not? I think there are a slew of models that give us those prescriptions.

Larry Lynn:

Well, and so does Gary Miller, in answer to that question. When you run out and you do the impossibility theorems and you're not going to get a line of preferences. So you need something else, which is he called leadership. You could call it a number of things. But the other thing is that all principal-agent relationships are incomplete contracts. They're not complete contracts. Only Fama and Jensen originally knew, thought there was going to be a wage scale, there was going to be a payment arrangement that would align preferences, a complete contract. But no contract is complete, that's what makes the management of contracts, the contract metaphor, an interesting, problematic case.

Anne Schneider:

I like the point Hank makes. It reminds me of some of the early assumptions about implementation. Implementation was considered successful – very much a normative idea-- if administrators complied with statutory prescriptions or guidelines. We find the same kind of idea in principal-agent theory: that compliance in fact means success. But we should keep in mind that legislators create policy designs and sometimes they intentionally leave considerable discretion so someone else can take the flack when things go wrong. The principal-agent theory sometimes seems to assume that the legislative body is always wanting to direct and constrain. Sometimes that isn't what they want at all.

Bryan Jones:

That's a good point. That's the underlying premise that gets in this.

Glen Krutz:

It's often hard to build majorities you need with really specific legislation.

Anne Schneider:

Or you may not want to take the blame for it when someone actually does comply. Then you can blame them. They used their discretion, and well I didn't have anything to do with that. That's Mike Brown.

Glen Krutz:

Erik.

Erik Godwin:

It may be that the principal-agent models don't work particularly well below the federal level or even on all parts of the federal level, but I wouldn't want you to abandon it. One of the reasons is because, part of the reason I left the Executive Office of the President was because I got tired of losing, and I was losing to the agencies. I wasn't losing to Congress. I was getting beat by the agencies day in and day out. And moving to the

private sector meant I won a lot more. The tool kit opened up a bit, but in addition to that, it was also…

Chris Weible:

Yeah, that old toolkit opened up alright.

Erik Godwin:

The agencies were really, really good at circumventing.

Bryan Jones:

Why do you think you were the principal?

Erik Godwin:

I don't believe that I was the principal.

Bryan Jones:

We've got a Madisonian system, which is driving me crazy in all this.

Erik Godwin:

You know Madison didn't like interest groups either; I'm not willing to go with a fully Madisonian system. It was always the case that there were two sides or more and that a lot of it depended upon who was better that day, who had more resources, you know, what was going on, who had stayed up later. I mean, it's just like in sports.

David Weimer:

Garbage can.

Erik Godwin:

No I don't believe that. But the principal-agent model has a part to play in the discussion if only because it's going to be difficult to empirically determine or express when the theoretical agents, and sometimes they're not, but when the theoretical agents are able to win more than you would expect. And that's an interesting question. It's an interesting question to ask for me in what policy areas and at what times are the agencies just simply more capable of getting their way. And so, the principal-agent framework gives us a nice way to look at that. It's not the only way, but it is useful. In part it's useful because it'll get published, people will pay attention, not just personally but people will pay attention.

Mara Sidney:

This is kind of building on some of the things Hank was saying, but I think that this kind of discussion is so important to driving policy theory forward. That is, really examining the implicit assumptions within the theories, both the normative and the empirical assumptions, and not being afraid or feeling threatened to do that. That has to be a part of our inquiry,

along with recognizing when those assumptions are limiting what we're looking at.

Glen Krutz:

The next couple of slides we've somewhat already hit on in the initial discussion, called implications number one and implications number two. At what point can we come up with normative standards that we can incorporate into policy world? We hit that a little bit before the break. And the second one: how do our theories inform other scholars? That came out a little bit. How do our theories inform practitioners? And I'll leave it up to the group whether you want to discuss these two implications a bit more or move on to the what's next.

Bryan Jones:

I would just add to that: how do practitioners inform our theories?

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

Yes. Crucial question.

Glen Krutz:

Anne?

Anne Schneider:

Well I was going to say on your first implication -- at what point can we come up with normative standards that we can incorporate into the policy world? We often have them embedded and already underlying what we do. Unless we're really reflective, we don't see them there. And I think a lot of us choose what we study because we have certain kinds of normative concerns about the world, about government, about the way people are treated. But whenever we deal with the consequences or results of policy, we observe things that are normative. We don't have to say this one's "good," that one's "bad," but we pick the range of consequences to be included in the study and those are normative choices. When all we look at is efficiency or benefits and costs, that's very much a normative choice. When we add responsiveness as Lin Ostrom has done in her work, that's a normative choice. When we add fairness or justice, which I do in mine, that's a normative choice. I don't say this policy is or isn't "good", but whenever we study consequences, results, or outcomes of policy, we make normative choices on what we include and what we omit.

Glen Krutz:

Another piece that someone in here has written about it is stability versus instability. And I think if we think about that in the context of what Hank was getting at yesterday about the micro, meso, macro, which is you know very much a reference to micro politics, meso politics, and macro politics, we can tease that out a little bit. For many decades in the United States

stability was where it was at. Americans, including elites, were fearful of the instability of democratic systems and the possibility having someone like a Hitler come along in a democratically-elected system, as we saw in Germany. And that was somewhat too critical to the policy developments, because it sets up non-incremental policy change as undesirable.

Anne Schneider:

Isn't that how we got George Bush as President? The Supreme Court was afraid of public instability and voted him in instead of requiring a recount? I'm half serious. I wasn't on the east coast at the time, but the Supreme Court seemed to be afraid of what the rest of us might do if we didn't get a president picked very quickly.

Chris Weible:

That's what they said.

Anne Schneider:

That's basically what they have claimed and said. That's stability, and where did that come from? They all studied political science.

Tom James:

Before we move forward on this, we might want to bear in mind as well it's not just the normative assumptions and values we place on these things that we ask, but also the normative values and assumptions that are associated with the empirical techniques we use. When we do, when we choose four variables to be orthogonal or oblique we make a value assumption for a value and/or assumption and all these modeling techniques have some underlying assumptions that we apply pretty rotely based on whether or not there are enough stars after what come out the other end. That might be something that we bring into this discussion as we move forward.

Glen Krutz:

Sam?

Sam Workman:

Glen, I'd just put forth in the same vein. I heard Bill Jacoby say once, and he's right on this, that in every single step of the process doing social science we're applying theory to some sort of observation and that counts for data too, as well, measure an observation. You're applying theory to that observation and the one thing we can in a normative sort of way impart I think to the policy world, and I think people in this room have tried to do this, and that is, and we've talked about it since we've started the conference is, the notion of having good measurements of things. This counts for budgets, right. I think we have a lot to tell people about how to make measures reliable or valid. We've certainly seen this in the

comparative Policy Agenda Projects, even exporting some of this work on the money flow of money to other countries.

Anne Schneider:
That's a normative judgment.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:
That goes back to your other normative point, which is transparency. You can't be transparent if your measures are mush.

[Many people talking at once]

Peter DeLeon:
Paul and I are agreeing, we should all take note of this. I mean I'm going to venture off and say politics is going to trump this all and if they can get along with mushy measures, they're probably happy to do that.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:
That's right. We're not saying that's not true, just referring to the fact that one of Anne's normative propositions yesterday was the idea that transparency was a good thing. Whether it is or is not, you're challenging that proposition. That's okay.

Peter DeLeon:
That's okay, be mushy.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:
I didn't say that.

Glen Krutz:
Anne, I hope it's okay. You had asked a very good question yesterday, the other day that we agreed to talk on today. You posed, 'can you explain change, policy change without specifying the direction of the change?' In other words, does it make sense for us to do it, to explain change, if you can't apply the direction?

Bryan Jones:
Since back in Alabama we used to say, head dog always hollers, I have to talk on this one because I'm the head dog out of…

Peter DeLeon:
Is that the way you put your pants on?

[Unintelligible jokes]

Bryan Jones:

The question of direction of change is an important one; I wouldn't deny it. Number one, even though our approaches haven't looked at the direction of change, that doesn't mean it's not important. It's just you just can't do everything at once. But the second thing is, there's something that seems to be missing in this, and I let it slide when we were talking about the principal-agent theory, and that is 'does the system work?' Is there an adaptability to it? You can get Gary's work, Gary Miller's work; it's great in telling us that democratic politicians can demand stupid things that don't work. Try the tax cut policies of the Republicans, something I know in detail. They've demanded a set of policies that are implemented and they're democratically imposed through the elected officials but they're just not going to work and they're going to hell. Good measurement analysis, and good feedback, with the policy practitioners is the kind of thing we need in that system. It doesn't matter whether you raise taxes, raise spending or whatever it is we know; the direction matters less than the fact that we know this fiscal system isn't going to work. Because you compare it to a set of standards, whatever those standards are, then we know the system as a whole is, may or may not be out of balance. I think those are questions we can address in the policy field rather than whether the goddamn politicians are voting for it which is the be-all end-all of political science. And that's not the only value in the system and it surely shouldn't be in the policy field where we wonder whether the design works, as Anne would put it, or whether as Tom put it there's an effectiveness in the system, or whether as we put it and Lin Ostrom puts it whether the whole system of complex governance is adaptable. And all of those questions don't have to directly address the direction question you know who gets what and so forth. That doesn't mean it's not important, for god's sakes that doesn't mean it's not important. It does mean it's not what I do, and I don't think you have to immediately jump to who gets what and have a sensible approach to policy change.

Peter DeLeon:

This has been a good question of what is your objective function. In the case of Robert Norquist it's to kill the beast called big government then the Republican tax cuts for the rich make a lot of sense

Bryan Jones:

Wrong, read that book. Wrong, absolutely wrong, at least the big government. Why? Because there's a price theory of government here. The less you pay for government the more you want it, it's good economics, it's good supply and demand. So you cut people's taxes, they're getting a lot of government for very little and they're going to want more of it, right? And why the 'slay the beast' crowd has missed that, I don't know. I mean Milton Freedman has a complicated theory about people hate deficits, they'll press the politicians. I suppose it comes

out of this lifetime income hypothesis he's pushed that's not right. And instead what happens when you get people to borrow money for the future and they have cheap government they ask for more. I mean, and that shows, we did a simple graph in this book, Jim Stimson's mood measure against the nominal tax rates, and they are incredible. It's the best thing ever been shown to the mood. It correlates better with the mood rates better than anything he's ever done, which means that the price of government matters not just the size of government and all this other stuff. It's something I shouldn't have to tell economists but I do. It's very strange stuff. So no, the 'slay the beast' thing doesn't work either. So Robert Norquist is wrong cause he's going to get bigger and bigger government

Hank Jenkins-Smith:
But you also develop crises when you under-fund government, which in turn can stimulate a demand for government centered around a particular crisis.

Bryan Jones:
Exactly.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:
So you get two mechanisms that serve to counteract the shrinking government.

Stéphane Lavertu:
At least two political scientists have argued in the literature that no matter what you do, you get more government.

Bryan Jones:
But we kept government from the middle of the Reagan years through the start of GW Bush, the size of government consistently shrank relative to the economy. After Reagan started raising taxes…

Stéphane Lavertu:
Measured how, though?

Bryan Jones:
I told you, the size of government expenditures relative to the economy shrunk until 2001.

Peter DeLeon:
But that was a function of the economy.

Bryan Jones:
It can do that too, but why?

Stéphane Lavertu:

It shrank under Clinton.

Bryan Jones:

It shrank, absolute terms it shrank under Clinton, that's right. It shrank even under GW, GHW Bush, I think, so our government doesn't always grow. There's not some, there's not some, society gets more complex and so we get more government. I think the mechanisms matter and as policy people we should really understand that. This is an Anne Schneider question. I learned so much from studying policy design out of her work because it's directly tied to this economic policy stuff that we manage to see. Design a bad policy, and you're going to get a bad outcome, and all the managers in the world are not going to save that.

Tom James:

Is the cost of government necessarily the size of government?

Bryan Jones:

Well there's other ways to measure, regulations and so forth, but you know.

Sam Workman:

Either way though, well you talk about the size of bureaucracy it goes, it fluctuates as well.

Stéphane Lavertu:

Yeah, but the general trend is up, you go far enough back the trend is up. It varies, across any given decade it might be down…

Bryan Jones:

Not as a proportion to the economy necessarily.

Stéphane Lavertu:

If you run the numbers though, Paul Light's numbers on the number of people whose livelihood depends upon government allotments, I think that number doesn't fluctuate as much as public appointments does, has, it goes up.

Bryan Jones:

Yeah, but again the economy is getting bigger. And you take the private sector and you relate how many people are having appointments in the private sector. The same thing happens. So in some ways not interesting unless you make it a relevant question

Edella Schlager:

But what this conversation demonstrates is again measures matter. So we need to be careful about how we measure things and be transparent about that because if we don't it's really unclear what we're contributing or what we're talking about.

Anne Schneider:

Maybe this is something that differs across different policy areas, which itself is an interesting question. Let's take something like agricultural subsidies. Can we explain change in agricultural subsidies policy without paying attention to whether they're going up or being cut? In welfare policy, can we explain the end of the entitlements with the same variables or theories that might explain their restoration? Let's suppose the "welfare reform" had doubled the entitlement instead of eliminating it. Would the theory, or explanation of that change be the same regardless of what direction the change took? I think the explanations for why imprisonment has now hit 2.3 million, in absolute numbers more than China, would be different than the reasons for it finally beginning to decline. It's an empirical question. Maybe for some kinds of change it doesn't matter what that direction is, as we can explain it with the same theories, and others you can't explain unless you're also looking at the direction.

Chris Weible:

Yeah, at least from the ACF, and Paul and Hank may disagree with me, it's often the external shock to the system. In the ACF, a lot of scholars have criticized it for just identifying the external shock but not linking the external shock to actual change in the system. The effect of an external shock is often distributing resources among coalitions. The question is how shocks alter the coalitions and how to connect the dots between shocks and change. I think once you start connecting the dots from the shock to the change then all those little dots start perhaps making sense related to the direction change. I think it's just a matter of bringing the microscope into more narrow focus on those causal links.

Anne Schneider:

And it may be that some kinds of change take place without external shock.

Chris Weible:

Well, that's why we have several different paths of change. But I think narrowing the scope down is an interesting question, and as a scholar, how narrow do we want to go? And I don't have an answer to that, but I think it's a great path of inquiry. And I don't think it's inconsistent with what we're talking about. Bryan Jones looked at change; Sam can look at direction of change. I think it's a good next step.

Paul Sabatier:

The answer to Anne's question. I think is partially a matter of how you define your variables. My short understanding of what caused the changes in prison populations is it went up dramatically after a crisis involving [muffled] which in turn led to the option of three strikes.

Anne Schneider:

No, there was no sudden single event. It started in every state between 1967 and about 1973 or 1974. Beginning in 1973, the U.S. total has continued upward essentially unabated until about the year 2000. Some states now had a year or two where there wasn't an increase, but most of them are now climbing again. So I think it's more like a critical juncture. A series of things came together probably starting in 1964 to 68. [Tom James shows her a newspaper.] Yes, I know I saw it this morning. One in every one hundred Americans is now behind bars. We hit a new high. So a critical juncture is a little different than an external shock because a critical juncture is several different things all coming together perhaps even a little bit incrementally. One of the important factors can be traced to the Goldwater campaign in 1964.

David Weimer:

There's also a sort of path dependence operating here because of the prisoner re-entry problem. We're going to be letting out larger and larger numbers of people and because what we've done to reduce their [muffled] they're going to be more likely to go back in. So this is a critical issue in policy, there will be a ripple.

Sam Workman:

Positive feedback

Anne Schneider:

Feed-forward. It's okay. It's a feed-forward.

Sam Workman:

I'd like to also suggest that what we're all getting at here is that especially with Anne the job of direction is starting to think about winners and losers and all that in the policy process, but even if we want to make a normative, no, I don't want to say that, I don't want to go there anymore. If we want to make an argument about what's good policy and bad policy, for years, we usually think about that in terms of change or as they were just saying you get change piles on change until it's all out of whack and without sense or sensibility to it. We can also say something about how good or bad the policy is going to be at that point.

[Laughter, shhhs, more laughter]

Bryan Jones:

You're not following the principal-agent model.

Alisa Hicklin:

It's all on tape. We'll review the records.

David Weimer:

We have sufficient oversight.

Sam Workman:

I was just going to suggest that we can talk about how good or bad a policy is going to perform in terms of its change as well. And that is, we usually think of change as in a directional, directionality, but if you have a policy, and the reason I know this is FEMA the last few years, if you have a policy that is just incredibly volatile, what you have is you have a situation where it really puts a strain on the coalitional arrangements, it puts a strain on agencies, puts a strain even on Congress as it introduces a lot of uncertainty. And so as an example I mean when we looked at FEMA what you saw all those grant programs you know, one year they're here, another year they're here, they get decreased by amounts, and it ended up a lot of people all through the federal system even at the state and local levels had no idea what to expect and the system, it just broke down. So I'm just suggesting volatility matters here as well.

Anne Schneider:

No I really like your kurtosis stuff.

Bryan Jones:

I know you used it. It's good, too!

Anne Schneider:

It's terrific. You know I'm really curious about finding differences in kurtosis across different kinds of policy outcomes. That's what I found in the American states, about half of them showed kurtosis in incarceration changes and the others did not.

Bryan Jones

In criminal justice too.

Anne Schneider:

In criminal justice, and maybe they'll show it in some other field. It's a fascinating question.

Bryan Jones:

But there's a directionality in those distributions too, because things are going up and down it's just that we haven't exploited that part of the data.

Glen Krutz:

Alright moving toward our what's next from that perspective. We actually had in mind just what Ken Meier suggested a little while ago. Warren?

Warren Eller:

Well I think that since Ken issued the challenge we ought to start in that direction, but let me frame this a little bit because we have a lot of names here. Impressed the hell out of me, both on the invitations, but more so in the conversations. We hear "you know I was talking to Lasswell" or "I remember when we had lunch together" that's what a lot of us junior people are going to be doing 20-30 years from now. I actually had somebody say when I said I was sitting at the bar with Larry, and they said, you mean Laurence Lynn? That's exactly what we're going to do. One of the things that excited me about this was really where the boundaries are going to be pushed. I think Hank came up with a good idea, that is what is the cutting edge of the theory you came in this room with. Where is it going, where is it going to be in 5 or 10 years? And maybe the place to start is with the juniors who come with these theories and with the help of the seniors. But I think since Ken issued the throw-down that his table probably ought to start this and answer what is going to be the cutting edge of the investigation of management for informing public policy theory over the next five, ten years?

Ken Meier:

I need a quick review. I hate it when they ask questions like that.

Alisa Hicklin:

They ask questions that you ask us.

Warren Eller:

We prefer to ask questions that we don't know the answers to.

Ken Meier:

Alisa, take it away.

Alisa Hicklin:

And he throws it to me. Thanks. So in terms of understanding management and how it fits into this discussion, I do think that there are going to be some really, really interesting advances if we can port this out of bureaucratic agencies into looking at how these management models fit lobbyists and legislators and different people who are trying to organize others, and how some are significant and some are not, and that could be very systematic. I also think that we're going to have to get a handle on

skill in a different way, and deal with the 'what about leadership' question because it's one that we always try to avoid, but are going to have to kind of get a handle on to some extent. At the same time there have been huge payoffs, I mean we're finding, I like to harass Ken about how his management model works too well sometimes. Oh no, I harass Ken all the time, self-defense really. But I mean it works all the time, to the point where you start saying I think it's fake, but it's not. I mean, that we can measure these things and systematically they matter in so many ways, and that to me is just astonishing to be honest that we've talked so much about leadership and management and have not found that, and now all of a sudden we're kind of starting to get some traction on that. But, Erik?

Erik Godwin:

You take all the low-hanging fruit. Go ahead.

Alisa Hicklin:

I think you're the only person I'm more senior than.

Erik Godwin:

Very good point. Good point. And we see what rolls downhill, so there. If I were looking at leadership which apparently we're going to shutter, but if I were looking at that, we know that stock prices change when CEOs come on board. We know that they're paid different amounts. And if I were looking for a metric on management we could measure I'd be really interested to know the number of times that a lobbyist or an agency or any other bureaucracy put someone in charge of an existing system and then check the fluctuations over time. Perhaps design a mutation model coming out of the biology literature that predicts based upon past performance and inputs how many times that policy system should mutate and then look at that versus what we actually see with individual managers and try to get a handle on it, get a handle on skill. There's no question at least for me (as a former lobbyist) you knew who was on the other side of the table every time, and if you didn't know you were going to lose. So who sits on the other side of the table, who's in charge of a different system, or who's pushing an idea really doesn't really matter in the likelihood of its success. And as long as I believe that I'm going to go looking for it. That's where I'd like to head. That's our table, this two thirds of it.

Alisa Hicklin:

I was about to say, Ken, your turn.

Erik Godwin:

Oh, do we get to make him answer?

Ken Meier:

I actually think this. I actually think what they're pointing out particularly the movement to other institutions, because when Larry O'Toole and I spun out our theory of management it wasn't about management, it was about how institutions govern themselves. And we always thought from day one that it was portable, and you know a year ago or two years ago in the Gaus lecture I explained how we were going to take over political science by doing this. And we've got a couple of students now that have just been getting things accepted doing this on the presidency. We have another student working now on Congress and how Congress is managed. I've got what I think is a really nice data set on the courts that I'm hoping somebody will pick up and do the same thing hoping that we can get people looking at different institutions in the same way. And so we can really ask is you know, how is Congress different as an institution? In my terms, it's a classic network, it's 435 people trying to figure out how to do, solve collective action problems and somehow management plays a role in that process. So you know, that's assuming that the next thing somebody else here doesn't say something and I think I've got to get back to that punctuated equilibrium stuff I was playing with Bryan or something. Because in my mind there are so many neat ideas out there to study, that's why to get my attention you have to have a better idea. I mean something that's going to say oh, that's more interesting than what I'm doing. I will guarantee one thing: it won't be on Texas school districts.

Warren Eller:

Robbie, is there something more interesting from the governance framework?

Robbie Robichau:

Well I think that we're really taking it from a broader perspective, obviously, and I think Larry's already mentioned it and Ashley brought it up, but there is a hierarchy in a policy context, stuff going up and down and maybe if you want to say, maybe things are happening on the sides, maybe there is some kind of interaction going on in our box. We put this box around and we called it the policy environment context. We've been discussing 'what does that mean?', 'what is that?' And 'how do you get at that?', 'how do you measure that?', 'how do you measure the relationships that are happening in between?' So I feel like that's something that the theory could really be developed for that could potentially be beneficial to policy studies. And maybe that's already been done, and maybe it's incorporating new ideas that go in with that. And also I think developing better management models. We have these broad frameworks almost, we have these broad theories but we don't have the models that are necessarily showing these theories to be empirically testable and provable, or falsifiable I should say, and so from our perspective it's getting at that

big picture of what's really going on whether we like it or not, that hierarchies exist and that people have to respond to these relationships.

Larry Lynn:

Again, you're looking for, this is what we've, why we've looked at all these different studies to see how different investigators are studying the management contribution. And usually it's in the form of looking at variation in how public managers in similar programs exercise their discretion. There may be strategic judgments that you can operationalize. It may be their use of different instruments. It may be something about their characteristics, which is what you were getting at, who they are. But if you get variance at that level and you can trace it downward toward any kind of output or any kind of consequence, you're learning something about the contributions of management within an institutional structure. What we'd like to be able to do is take all Ken's work and Larry's work and get variance across the states in their institutional governance instead of just studying Texas and see how the findings would co-vary with different kinds of institutional arrangements, it would be very interesting. Getting variance at that level is very difficult where the policy designs allow states, say federal programs allow states to implement in their own way, then you can study it; we've done that with welfare policies. That's the key to it, is to study it, find data sets with variance at different levels.

Ken Meier:

Just to tag on to that, because Larry's right, and that's that in April we'll be launching a study of all public and private universities in the United States with management as a component and outputs. And this will allow us to play with the difference in governance structures across the states

Alisa Hicklin:

And public opinion.

Ken Meier:

And it will also allow us to play with private implementation of the same processes.

Larry Lynn:

That's good stuff.

Warren Eller:

How about delegation?

Stéphane Lavertu:

I'm a representative they don't even know is representing them, so I…

Bryan Jones:

Standing in the back a couple of times I noticed.

Stéphane Lavertu:

People are doing this stuff whether people here like it or not. They're going to keep testing these models and get publications out of it, and people have this stake in extending and messing with these delegation models. I'm not going to suggest to you any directions, but what I would suggest is just to pay attention to what delegation scholars are doing to see what the implications are for your work. What are the structures that you're going to be stuck with when you're trying to do this management? What are these structures going to do for information flows? I think that was the purpose of our paper.

Bryan Jones:

Can I just make a brief comment here? You're right about publications coming in that area. The question seems to me to be 'can it be found out?' There's no doubt hierarchy works, and I think you guys are working on this and I applaud it.

Warren Eller:

Dave, you want to build on that?

David Weimer:

I think there are some interesting questions and extensions. I've already mentioned what Stéphane is doing, which I think captured some of your sympathy. I also think that the delegation question is a little bit broader than principal-agency. And there are issues of blame avoidance and credit seeking and finding a way to integrate those within the principal-agent framework.

Bryan Jones:

I remembered my second point, and that is that some of the things we forget in our policy dynamics field is the strategic action part, and even if we object to the preferences being too fixed and uncertainty being too circumscribed, there's a strategic component to the way in which bureaucrats interact with politicians, and that's great stuff.

Xavier Basurto:

I think as we showed in the presentation we're interested in change. We're interested in making, moving from static theories to dynamic theories and really trying to understand what we mean by institutional change. And so the framework of institutional analysis has given us some tools to start exploring that, and we need to look at our unit of analysis, what you call, our actual situation, and in an actual situation we have the moving parts which are different types of rules, we develop a rule type model. And as we define institutions as the rules, norms, and strategies that humans use

to govern interactions, we think that if we start to understand how those rules combine, we'll start to understand how those rules contract. So the first step is to acknowledge that rules have a combinational nature. It's like to think the very first step to get serious about thinking about institutional change.

Glen Krutz:

I would encourage you two to especially look at some of the literature on Congressional rules changes, Sarah Binder's work and especially Eric Schickler's work. They ask some of these same questions: the nature of rules, considering the rules as institutions, the external piece you were thinking about yesterday they wrestled with in that literature.

Xavier Basurto:

The other thing we don't have in our paper but that Lin Ostrom and her group is starting to do is this issue of scales: how we start linking you know across scales? We focus on the local level, but we acknowledge that when people organize on the ground it's influenced by higher governance levels. So that's another piece. And my final comment is as we are trying to address this question, I would also like to know what everybody thinks was the common thread in all the papers. That would be a way of seeing what people are moving toward.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

So you are posing that question to your mentor?

Edella Schlager

I hope he doesn't hold me to that.

Xavier Basurto:

I would just like to know what everybody's thoughts were on the common themes.

Warren Eller:

Hank you proposed a new variable as part of your theory. Not only should you tell us where the frontier is, but you should take Ken up on his second challenge and tell us which two variables you're going to kick out of your analysis.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

Well I'm not so sure that I'm wedded to the idea that you have to add a variable. What I am wedded to is the idea that there needs to be a little bit more consistency across levels of scale, but even more broadly than that what I'm intrigued with is the ontology of the policy process and what it is that we think we're looking at when we use so many different overlapping conceptions. When we talk about public policy it's hard sometimes to

keep it straight. Sometimes we're talking about issue domains, sometimes we're talking about subsystems that may overlap across issue domains, sometimes we're talking about institutional settings. And I think someplace in all that there is what I've called a policy topography within which the actual human behavior of attempting to push collective decision making forward happens. And it is a combination of venues, of issue concerns, and networks, and information and ideas are integral to it. What I'm hoping to see across the collective endeavors that we're engaged in is a way to make sense of that. I'd like to start a course in public policy off by saying here's the ground. This is what we're making sense of. And it's hard to do that now. And I think that progress on this front would allow us to talk sensibly about what Tom was getting at, that there are important issues that happen in a space in which a particular entrepreneur, or agency, or piece of analysis has a big impact. And there are other places where it's so thick with growth and so shot through with well-trod advocacies that it's very difficult to get any purchase on the basis of one single action. And if we could say something about that in a coherent integrated fashion, I think we could train people to operate in that. Think of the tools that people could be given for how to work if you find yourself in this kind of environment. These are the sorts of things that really work, and these are kinds of the management skills that really matter, whereas if you find yourself over here in the thick versus thin growth kind of environment. These are the tools that you would want to bring to bear. This is the kind of thing I want to see us able to go to. And so rather than think of any specific variable I think I want to integrate the variables that we have and figure out which ones give us leverage to talk about policy.

Peter DeLeon:
And so how does that affect speaking truth to power?

Hank Jenkins-Smith:
That'll have to be another conversation Peter.

Peter DeLeon:
But that's the charter that Aaron gave us all.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:
Yes, it is, and he's my intellectual grandfather, so yes, it will affect speaking truth to power in the sense that the agents, the people we train to go off and serve in the bureaucracy will be able to see a lot further. I think what happens now in policy debate is that often we're so focused on a few of the pieces of what's happening that you can't really embed it into that larger system. And so first off seeing how to get, in an instrumental sense, how to get from one place to another we're badly constrained. We get pushed over by events that take place that we weren't monitoring for.

Peter DeLeon:

But the true thesis was a great example of a simple question, when we ship oil from Alaska and it got, I mean, so the analysts from the Department of the Interior were here, the State Department was here and they weren't able to look at each other's visions.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

That's right, that's correct. And not only that, they got locked into a form of combat that made it harder and harder to see past their own parochial perspectives, because the other guys were just 'bad'. But I want to stop because I really am interested in hearing what other people are thinking about this, about their own notions of where we go forward.

Warren Eller:

Do you want to build on this?

Paul Jorgenson:

I think this dovetailed pretty nicely and I think there's one question that would make actors structure the implications: how do actors transform information out there that we can use for public policy, and I've been listening to all the talk and there seems to be an unnecessary dichotomy between policy and process. How does content change over time and turn into a policy? And second thing that would help combine this knowledge of the process and knowledge in the process. Knowledge in the process is what Dr. James does and how does that content get used and picked up combined over time? And sort of underneath all of this is the first time I heard the word power today was just now, and as a graduate student in political science, what is the implication of having power being implicit in our conversations and not explicit in our conversations? That would be a good endeavor.

Tom James:

The other thing I would add to that is given the kinds of things I've been seeing over the last day and a half and going back to the very beginning of what I said and that Chris mentioned in his conclusions part of his paper there that at one point in time the distinction between knowledge and other knowledge is the process and content was perhaps useful in getting things going. That's an artificial distinction and Hank's point that he just said in how to operate here and how to operate there is bringing that together, so that if you understand enough about process you can then operate effectively with the knowledge in it. By coaching advice, analyses and advice, you know how to operate depending on what the environment is, what the context is and what the process looks like.

Warren Eller:

Anybody have an animal analogy that will tell us where the frontiers are?

Ashley Jochim:

I'm not very good with analogies, but what I have to say dovetail's well with what Hank said. I think the scale question is so important here, particularly in information processing, the approach that we've developed. Where I see the future of this theory is expanding into different institutional settings and this both in the United States, up and down in the layers of federalism including the state and even the local level, and also internationally, looking at how information processing plays out in different institutional settings. I think that's where I see the future of this theory really going.

Sam Workman:

Oh, me? No animals this time. I think it's in studying now the supply of information and we talk a lot and Bryan's done a lot of work in the last 10 years about the notion of how institutions prioritize the agenda, right, the information agenda. But now we need to turn toward understanding where that information is coming from and also how people in those environments you know manage to use Ken's terminology or how coalitions to talk about the ACF or subsystems, how information is generated in those systems. And being more specific, empirically, addressing Hank's, I think you're right about the scale question as well. I mean we've moved up the scale, and it may be time to move back down and look at how policy decisions can constrain or expand information flows to policy areas under different, people like to say institutions, but I think of it more as when you talk about subsystems you're really talk about the organization of an issue area in some respects. How are issue areas organized to process information and to restrict or provide information?

Glen Krutz:

Are they even organized?

Sam Workman:

And are they even organized, which is something you're getting at.

Bryan Jones:

I don't know what they'll be doing in 5 years; I don't know what the field's going to be doing in 5 years. I'm hoping what I'm going to be doing in a few years is thinking through something that bugged me. Two things have driven what I've been doing in all the many years. I've been a political scientist and a policy scholar. Sometimes I didn't really recognize I was a policy scholar. One is the question of how decisions get made in systems, in complex systems, and the other is how, the stability question. And they're linked because remember the models that my generation was

handed, through the masters like Wildavsky and Dick Fenno and Charles Lindblom, was incrementalism. Incrementalism has three facets, doesn't it? There's a normative capacity that we shouldn't forget, and that is that all these scholars wrote about how great it was to be incremental and how policy would work better because they were based in bounded rationality. And bounded rationality posits that the environment's incredibly uncertain and it interacts with the decision-making capacities of the individual. And these individuals try to structure decisions, and for Aaron whose, a fair sharing decision, based in fair-share. It wasn't necessarily tightly incremental in terms of real world units because the fair-share rule would kick in there. But that didn't leave much room for the big changes I thought probably happened in politics. Or if it did it pushed it all back in the classic quantitative study, that Davis and his group, Wildavsky paper, it puts it into the exogenous part of the equation, which I'm not satisfied with. Complex systems interact in complex ways, and until I started reading a lot of that literature, the complex systems literature and the biology literature, I was trapped. I couldn't get out of how you might fit this change in. As a consequence I think we're reading the wrong literature, we're reading too much economics and not enough biology, but that's another conversation in my opinion. Now when we pick up on punctuated equilibrium, I think it's only one way to study bigger changes, but I think if you don't get out of this trap of incrementalism and stasis which too many of these models still have, including my bug-a-boo the principal-agent model which it's got mixed up. How does policy change, how does an agent change, only through changing the principals and legislative institutions? And I think that complex systems interact in more ways than that. I am, and it's interesting that Danielle mentioned the power function in stochastic process. We haven't mentioned this, but just my methods have tended in recent years to focus on stochastic process methods. Not regression, not modeling, but stochastic process because you can't handle the complexities if you don't understand the causation very well. And one of the things that's emerging in natural sciences is the ubiquity of this power function. And I've actually, I'm working as a physicist now, I am interdisciplinary folks, not just in psychology and biology but I also work as a physicist. And one, a friend of mine is a guy name Albert-Laszlo Barabasi and he's the guy you cited with regard to the web, the prioritization into the web, the hub and spoke question of webs. But he's done something else, and that is he's shown how in systems in which there is some sort of prioritization you get bursts of activity. He's got a new book coming out he's working on called *Bursts*. He wrote one called *Link*; it's a great book on the sort of stuff you guys are dealing with. And the point here is that there's scale built into the power function. It's called scale 3 which means the same phenomenon, the same disruptions are at all scales whether high or low or wherever, so the same sort of phenomenon, the same sort of laws may describe the same thing in different scales even though the scales didn't interact. That's not a

problem. So finally, I'm sorry to be so long-winded, I want to study something I call the drop in dynamics because I want to understand, try to understand why it is we have got arguments in this profession about things like realignments, and Stimson now has the mandate elections. We talk about punctuated equilibrium. Are we all talking about the same thing? It just finds its way through institutions that are similar, that are more similar than we think, but are structured by the nature of the institutions and the, there's a role for management here, and subsystems that I've studied so much in my career. How does this work at a broader scale? And can we do some integrated work here? And maybe that's not helpful when you get to the particular content of policies, but hell I'm old I can do what I want, I got tenure.

Glen Krutz:

What about Danielle and Peter since Bryan gave you the segue?

Danielle Varda:

I was just thinking we're on the same page; we're in the same box. I would just like to say that, I didn't know which order to say this in, but when I think of the next generation of policy theory I hope that all of us who are junior can also not just build on these foundations but be brave enough to maybe think of the new theory as well, and I think that's what I took kind of literally by what we meant at first. And I think there's a blending of that, and you can't do one without the other of course. But I think what we're thinking about with networks is really just almost a new way to operationalize a lot of what we've talked about. I don't think networks, I mean, hierarchies are different from networks; that's what we say by modeling the incident command structure. It's a hierarchy and we're calling that a network. So what we're proposing is to take a specific empirical approach that brings in the network science to it and look at different variables and different ways of understanding things like information exchange and leadership and agents and coalitions and subsystems. And so I am excited about building on this foundation and looking at it through a new operational lens. And I hope that's what we can contribute. Peter?

Peter DeLeon:

The smartest thing I can say right now is I agree.

Danielle Varda:

Well Peter encourages me because he says when he started this we didn't, he didn't really think about networks. No one was really talking about it and so you know it's really fun to see also how the foundation's built and changed and I think we're hoping to run alongside society's changes you know and keep that analysis relevant.

Glen Krutz:

Let's head over to Schneider and Sidney.

Mara Sidney:

I guess one thing I would like to see is the continuation of Helen and Anne's work of taking stock of social construction and policy design theory — in a similar way to what we saw with the ACF — really looking at the studies that have been done using this framework and bringing together what we know. But not only just what we've learned from those studies, but also the range of ontological and epistemological stances underneath them to see if there's variation and to really look at the methodological diversity. I'm very curious to see how others have actually operationalized these concepts. I know in my case when I did it, it was hard. There were a lot of decisions to be made, so I think there's some housekeeping, some taking stock that's begun that could continue. Another thing that I'm very interested in is the interactions of policy designs on the ground. The approach tends to lead us look at policy designs sort of one at a time, but I think building on some of what you've been talking about with configurations, that actually there are configurations of policy design that work together. That's a direction it could go in. Also certainly what I think is a core part of the research along these lines is looking at continuity and change so looking, continuing to discern the patterns that we see in policy designs and their impacts, but also the changes, the moments of change and breaks from the pattern and really scaling that up to think about the system-level implications of that. Two more things; also I think there's more to do in developing the ideas of policy contexts that Anne spoke about briefly at the end of our talk, and how that's different from venues and the variation and dynamics depending on the context and the evolution of those contexts. I think we could do maybe more thinking about the limits of this approach or the points where integration with other theories is really needed. And then finally I think we can model, we can work on more consciously modeling for the policy studies community, ways of bridging our empirical and normative analysis.

Glen Krutz:

Anne, do you have anything to add to that?

Anne Schneider:

Thanks to Paul Sabatier who insisted that we put a table in his book, I actually went out and dug up I think about 60 studies that have used the policy design and social construction framework. That has helped us get a sense of where other people have focused. Most of them are people we've never heard of, most of them are in fields that we don't know much about, and most of them have focused on how the interaction of power and social constructions produces different kinds of policy designs. I'm interested in

continuing to work with policy feedback or feed forward, whichever you want to call it. I'm particularly interested in the effects of policy design on political participation. I think policy experience is a very understudied aspect in the political participation literature. So that's one of the things on my agenda. The next thing is context. Most of the work that Helen and I have done has been in a context that we call degenerative pluralism, which is where you have very unequal power, as well as unequal and divisive social constructions. But we're working now on policy analysis for collaborative governance, and trying to think through what kind of policy analysis will be helpful in a collaborative governance setting that maybe does or maybe does not have these unequal power and unequal and divisive social constructions. And so this moves into the social construction of everything: people, objects, institutions. Collaboration itself becomes a design to be studied. So that's what I'm doing.

Glen Krutz:
Dave, do you want to speak?

David Weimer:
I would like to make a plea to everyone working in a particular framework: can you tell me to pay attention to when evidence, arguments, things we might think of as policy analysis make a difference? Because if your model doesn't have that in it, it doesn't keep my interest. So please put some institutions back in.

Bryan Jones:
Your arguments are still there, you'll admit that. Your arguments are still there.

Glen Krutz:
Chris?

Chris Weible:
At least from my perspective ever since people started interacting and living in a society, to some extent, they formed tribes and teams and factions and alliances and parties and coalitions. It's something about our nature and I think trying to understand both the formation and collective action of that the structure, the stability, and how it changes as the context changes is still an important question that we really don't understand very well. And as we are getting more aware of subsystem interdependencies and how they are overlapping and how these coalitions are structured we'll find some very important questions. And it's not just one person, it's a coalition of people and if you don't understand those coalitions I don't see us going forward in understanding the policy process. And I think that would also connect to who's winning and losing. When I look at the ACF literature, we label coalitions without really getting into the

question of “what are coalitions?” And I think it’s the same thing with the social construction framework: they put people up there the quadrants, these diagrams without really measuring how they’re actually constructed, maybe because measuring makes life more complicated and messier. Good science often raises the complexity of uncertainty and that raises more questions than answers, which is what I’ve found by applying the advocacy coalition framework. Other issues that I would like to move forward on are many. My research will go more into the role of science in the policy process, which also leads into this blending we’re seeing of policy analysis and the policy process. I can’t see myself understanding the role of science and the policy process without understanding both of those fields. And I think those fields need to be blended. I’m a strong proponent of multiple theories, and I’ve talked to Edella about a lot this and I’m interested in how you think because the more I study these theories the more I realize it’s just a different state of mind.

Peter DeLeon:

You know Edella’s in a different frame of mind.

Chris Weible:

Well that’s true too, but I find that I might need to go to Indiana and learn that framework, and I’m hoping to work with Anne Schneider on social constructions, in part because I think I’ll learn more about the ACF doing that. I consider myself a policy process scholar. And Paul’s taught us to use multiple theories, and no one’s done it enough because it’s just too hard to think in two or more different theoretical languages. Other than that it’s been a pleasure to be here so thank you.

Hank Jenkins-Smith:

Paul?

Paul Sabatier:

I just have one thing to add and that is biased assimilations are at the core of the model of the individual in the ACF, but we’ve never tested it, so that’s my project for the next five years. And if I have the floor for a minute I’d like to say a couple of things. First, as I think most of you know that in 1991 I wrote a paper for PS basically arguing that political scientists had really [messed] up when it came to public policy, and policy scholars also had things to offer political science mainly in terms of the breadth of variables in institutions we involve, and laying out an argument that essentially what we needed were better theories and several better theories. That’s been my fundamental research program for the last 25 years. In the course of developing the program I think the major contributions thus far have been the two theory books. And I might say that the first edition of the theory book basically sold 1,000 copies a year.

Peter DeLeon:

Wish I saw those checks.

Bryan Jones:

He's got to be doing stages theory.

Paul Sabatier:

And so far what hadn't happened is exactly this sort of gathering. What I should have been doing over the years is every two to three years is putting together a workshop and fortunately Hank has done it for me this time. But I think this is a great way to proceed. The master in all of this is Lin Ostrom. Now none of us, I don't think, are going to wind up doing a project of her scale. And so thank you very much Hank for organizing this thing and you guys for coming in and being so darn cantankerous. Even Anne has gotten more cantankerous, mainly towards me.