RCLS Panel
“Implementing Legislative Strengthening Programs: Who is in Control?”

Over the last few decades, International development (known as Official Development Assistance or ODA) has been under attack for its lack of effectiveness. These attacks have ranged from the specifically programmatic (i.e. how a donor agency implements aid programming) to the universal (i.e. does ODA promote development or, perversely, impede development?) At both levels, a critical question is the control over the development initiative asserted by the donor agency. This paper examines a variety of implementation strategies, including their strengths and weakness, keyed to the level of control asserted by the donor agency. These strategies fit within two dialectical extremes. On the one hand, most major donors have traditionally applied a Strong Design Application Approach (SDAA) approach or expert driven strategy of program design and implementation. At the other extreme, in part driven by beneficiary countries, some development is now being implemented according to a Strong Local Ownership (SLO) model of development in which development programming is determined and executed according to the direction of the beneficiary government. Between these two extremes lie three additional models, each of which has been offered as an alternative to SDAA. These include: Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA), which replaces control by the donor with control by the implementer who uses an empirically based trial and error approach to program development and implementation; the Consultancy Assistance model (CAM), which places the beneficiary in control of the development project assisted by international experts who serve as consultants to the beneficiary; and the Best Practice Partnership Approach (BPPA), which treats development as a partnership or collaboration between the donor agency, implementer, and beneficiary. We illustrate our argument through a review of funded legislative strengthening projects – many of which are USAID funded projects that have been implemented by the Center for International Development (SUNY/CID) of the University at Albany, State University of New York.

Panelists
David E. Guinn, SUNY Center for International Development
Jeffrey D. Straussman, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy, University of Albany SUNY
RCLS Panel
“Mandatory Data Reporting: The Unused Tool in Legislative Oversight”

Data is the basis of oversight. Without consistent, accurate data about the implementation of government programs, their geographic distribution, their impact and their cost, it is impossible for the legislature, policy analysts or civil society groups to assess whether the programs being implemented by the government are being implemented correctly and are having their intended effect. In the United States, the Congress includes extensive and specific mandatory reporting requirements with every piece of legislation. (Indeed, executive branches from both parties have objected to the proliferation of congressional reports, and frequently ask for Congressional restraint in imposing new reporting requirements.) Congress imposes reporting requirements because they understand their value. The data they generate can be analyzed for political, substantive and policy-related purposes. These reports are the basis for oversight hearings. By contrast, these reporting requirements are relatively under-utilized or even unknown in parliamentary and other government systems. The lack of data and transparency undermines legislative efforts at oversight in those systems, even in situations where the political and structural context would make legislative oversight feasible and desirable. Furthermore, the absence of reporting requirements almost always means that data is not actually collected; imposing legally-binding data collection requirements would improve the technical quality of data and analysis available to the executive branch. The paper argues that many legislatures - especially in developing countries - would benefit from including reporting requirements in legislation, and that international providers of legislative assistance should consider recommending these requirements as part of their programs to strengthen oversight and legislative capacity.

Panelist
Tomas Bridle, Independent Development Consultant
Developmental community has been assisting parliaments around the world in building their institutional capacity. The assumption has been and remains that a democracy in any country requires a strongly institutionalized legislature. Yet, we see struggling democracies in the presence of a strongly institutionalized legislature. The literature points to the issue of corruption as one of the main impediments in the process of democratic consolidation in a post authoritarian society. This study analyzes factors associated with the perceived importance of dealing with the issue of corruption in the Ukrainian Rada. Based on eight waves of original survey data, it discusses factors that are associated with legislative perception of the importance of dealing with the issue of corruption.

Panelists
Irina Khmelko, University of Tennessee
Michael Bonnal, University of Tennessee
The literature on the new parliament in the East-Central Europe is dealing with various stages of their development. In the first stage they reached institutional stability by establishing internal structure and organizing rational process of decision-making. The second stage was characterized by negotiations and preparation for the accession to the EU when parliaments had to harmonize national legislature with the EU law (Olson and Norton, 2008: 117). The final accession to the EU could be considered as the beginning of the third stage when the EU became increasingly an integral part of the legislative process. The third stage is actually the stage when interaction between the external factors and events and national parliaments intensified because of the disruptive effects of economic crisis. The economic crisis has had a strong effects on the national economies and well-being of large groups of citizens which can be measured by several indicators used in various analyses of economic trends. These effects provoked substantial changes in the support to the established political parties expressed in high level of electoral volatility. Political instability and the appearance of the new political parties have had further effect on the forming of coalitions and duration of parliaments. Some parliaments of the region experienced shorter mandates and early elections were called. The appearance of new inexperienced deputies caused a number of problems for the management of the parliamentary business and legislative process and increased the distance between the voters and parliaments.

Panelist
Drago Zajc, University of Ljubljana
Transitions to democracy include mainly in two phases. The first phase occurs when an authoritarian regime is replaced by a democratic government through an exit election. The second phase of democratic consolidation occurs when the rules of democratic regime, including rule of law, regular elections etc. become effective.

Two competing models of democratic transition and consolidation are structural (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992), and agent/actor centered (Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, 1997; Juan Linz, 1990). The political culture necessary for democratic governance includes: moderation, cooperation, bargaining, and accommodation among political elites (Diamond, 1993).

This paper compares the decisional authority of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in consolidating democracy in two different periods: 1991-1995 (highly fragmented and polarized parliament with a mixed coalition government) and 2011-2015 (less fragmented and polarized parliament with a majority single party government). An elite actor-centered approach is used while historical context and constraint factors are considered. We assume that a majoritarian orientation excludes the consideration of "minor" but significant views when a legislature is building a consensus. It is also considered that a lack of institutionalization especially lessens the decisional autonomy and independence of a legislature as a superior law-making body vis-a-vis other governmental branches.

First, we examine the parliamentary process on two legislations (liberalization of state monopoly in broadcasting and Law on Criminal Court Procedure) included in the democratization package of the mixed coalition government are evaluated. Second, the parliamentary debates on the Law on Internal Security and Parliamentary Immunities which were adopted recently are analyzed.

Parliamentary minutes, in-depth interviews with some politicians and newspaper coverage are the major unit of analyses. It can be stated that the Turkish political elite and the state elite have not developed a political culture conducive to the full fledged democratic practice.

Panelists
Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, Marmara University
Gamze Çürüksulu, Recep Tayyip Erdogan University